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The topic of piercing the corporate veil has long been a debated phenomenon 
globally.  In the United Kingdom, the landmark case of Salomon v Salomon and Co 
Ltd1 provided much needed clarity in the application and acknowledgment of the 
independence of the juristic entity from its key players. 
 
The courts have been mindful of this fundamental rule and have also declared that this 
separate identity is not absolute as in certain instances the corporate veil will be set 
aside.  Various statutes have been introduced to provide the courts with guidelines as 
in what instances veil piercing will be acceptable. The most notable statute is the 
introduction of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (hereinafter referred to as the ―2008 
Act‖). 
 
Worldwide, tax authorities in their role as tax administrators and collectors have been 
faced with the veil piercing dilemma.  The aim of this dissertation is to determine if 
the South African Revenue Service (hereinafter referred to as SARS) could use the 
Tax Administration Act 29 of 2011 (hereinafter referred to as the ―Tax Admin Act‖) 
to attach the tax liability of an entity such as the close corporation to its members.  
 
To determine this, an investigation into the variety of sources available to SARS to 
pierce the corporate veil is required.  The practical application by SARS, thus far, in 
their ability to attach the tax liability of a juristic entity to its key players is essential 
to determine how the SARS has been dealing with these types of matters. 
 
The enactment of the much needed Tax Admin Act has provided SARS with even 
further reaching powers when it comes to the collection of taxes. 
 
An evaluation of the definition of a taxpayer, as contained in Section 151 of the Tax 
Admin Act, will be considered.  In particular, the concepts of the Representative 
taxpayer and the Responsible third person shall be discussed as both these terms 
empower SARS to attach the tax liability of a juristic entity to a natural person should 
the tax debt remain unpaid. 
                                                 




The Tax Admin Act provides SARS with even further reaching powers to enforce the 
collection of the corporation‘s tax debts against another person. It appears as though 
the legislature has paved the way even further for SARS to target and hold responsible 
the key players of a corporation.  
 
From a global perspective, an investigation into how the tax authorities of foreign 
jurisdictions have been dealing with the concept of lifting the corporate veil will be 
conducted. In light of the findings, a determination of how South Africa compares 
globally in its approach to the veil piercing doctrine by the tax authorities shall be 
made. 
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One of the most controversial aspects of South African company law is the concept of 
the juristic legal personality and in what instances is it acceptable for a court to ignore 
the separate existence of an entity and ―pierce the corporate veil‖.  When a court 
decides to pierce the veil this essentially removes the protective shield of the 
corporation and attaches the liability to the members of the entity in their personal 
capacity.  Piercing the veil has been one of the most litigated issues in commercial 
law, yet it still remains the most misunderstood.  This lack of clearly defined 
principles has resulted in a number of overlapping list of factors that the courts must 
consider. 
 
Traditionally, the common law notion of piercing the veil was applied when the 
interests of the creditors had to be weighed against the rights and duties of the 
company‘s members.  The landmark case of Salomon v Salomon and Co Ltd2 set the 
precedent that a company has its own legal personality distinct from its members.  
This fundamental rule has had exceptional influence on decisions involving the 
piercing of the veil.  However, it is not an absolute rule as exceptions do exist and the 
courts tend to determine matters on a case by case basis. 
 
When to look at the corporation as a separate unit and when to look at it as a 
―collection of persons‖ is a question the courts seem to answer judging by the merits 
of each case.  To date, no set rule has existed and the courts appear to have not 
established a step by step guideline when faced with this decision. This doctrine of 
piercing the veil appears to be inherently flawed as its application in South African 
law has proved problematic time and time again.  
 
Legislatures have attempted to curb the issue of its problematic application by 
introducing statutes that actually provide in what instances the veil may be pierced.  
Such legislation includes but is not limited to the Close Corporation Act No.69 of 





1984 (hereinafter referred to as the CC Act) and the relatively new 2008 Act which 
assists with the regulation of close corporations and companies in general. 
 
The introduction of the Tax Admin Act into the current tax law regime has brought 
about further issues regarding the separate legal personality of a corporate entity.  It 
appears as if this piece of legislation which provides for a more consolidated version 
of the tax laws, has provide the local tax authorities with the power to target the 
taxpayer if and when necessary.  The Representative taxpayer which was already 
introduced into tax law in the Income Tax Act No.58 of 1962 (hereinafter referred to 
as the Income Tax Act) and the Value Added Tax Act No. 89 of 1991 (hereinafter 
referred to as the VAT Act) has been broadened further with the introduction of the 
Tax Admin Act.   The Responsible third party is another important concept that 
requires an analysis. 
 
This paper seeks to evaluate whether SARS can apply provisions in the Tax Admin 
Act to pierce the corporate veil of a close corporation and attach the tax debt owed by 
the corporation to its members. 
 
1.2 The Aims of the dissertation 
 
The aims of this dissertation are as follows: 
 
To determine the ability of SARS to hold the members and others who stand behind 
the close corporation responsible for the tax debts of the close corporation.  To assess 
this, it is necessary to provide an analysis of the close corporation as a juristic entity 
and its position within the South African corporate sphere.  This entails an 
investigation into the origin of the close corporation as well as the changes instituted 
with the introduction of new legislation. 
 
This paper seeks to discuss and evaluate the concepts of separate legal personality and 
the piercing of the corporate veil as this is what prevents SARS from holding others 
associated with the entity responsible for its tax debts.  This will entail a discussion on 
the common law as well as applicable statutes that have aided in the development of 




This dissertation will then turn to a discussion on the South African fiscal system. 
This will involve a discussion on taxation in general and applicable dispute resolution 
procedures.  An overview of the introduction of the Tax Admin Act will commence. 
 
Finally, in light of all this information this research paper will discuss the concept of 
piercing the corporate veil from a tax perspective.  Lifting or piercing of the corporate 
veil is important since this is one of the tools that SARS may make use of in order to 
hold persons standing behind the entity responsible for its tax debts.  An evaluation of 
SARS ability to attach the tax liability of the corporate entity to its key players will be 
investigated.  This investigation will entail an overview of the various sources at 
SARS disposal.  For the purpose of this paper, the most influential source is the Tax 
Admin Act. This Act could indeed enable SARS to argue that where a corporation 
lacks the financial resources to pay its taxes, such tax liability should be imposed on 
one of its key players.   
 
1.3 Research Methodology 
 
This paper is largely based on desktop research, scholar articles as well as case law 
and prevailing statutory legislation.  The findings reached at the end are in no way 
conclusive and are a matter of opinion reached from conducting this research.   
The findings are mainly based on case law and the way the courts have in the past 
evaluated their decisions and reasons for the way they reached their conclusions. 
I have also included a comprehensive list of articles by scholars and colleagues as 




















2.  THE CLOSE CORPORATION 
 
The first step in the evaluation of the efficacy of the lifting of the corporate veil 
doctrine in allowing SARS to hold taxpayers standing behind the close corporation 
responsible for the tax debt of the close corporation is to consider the make-up of the 
close corporation, in particular the separate legal personality characteristic of that 
close corporation.  This issue will be dealt with in this chapter. 
 
2.1 The origin of the close corporation 
 
A countries economy is significantly affected by the legal framework within which it 
operates. A country‘s corporate law impacts on wealth creation and economic 
prosperity.  In order to ensure a prosperous economy, especially in a developing 
country such as South Africa, it is imperative that corporate law rules are simple, clear 
and certain.   The types of business entities made available by a countries legal system 
must be flexible, manageable and easily incorporated in order to promote and 
facilitate economic growth.  These business entities must cater for the diverse needs 
of its entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurship is further promoted by catering for smaller 
business opportunities.   
 
Corporate law in South Africa had become extremely complex by the end of the 
1980‘s.  The prevailing legislation catered primarily for larger companies, often due 
to the detriment to the small private business owner.  Irrespective of the size of the 
business entity, the prevailing legislation applied uniformly3.  This legislation was 
complex, out-dated and had become extremely cumbersome due to numerous 
amendments.  The result was that it became too complicated to run businesses on a 
small to medium scale.  This hindered the economic growth in the country as the 
entrepreneur was subjected to compliance with onerous legal formalities.  A need for 
corporate law reform proved essential in order to put an end to the suffocating 
provisions provided for in the prevailing legislation.  
 
In 1981, a proposal was submitted to the Standing Advisory Committee on Company 
Law which provided for the introduction of a new legal vessel to meet the needs of 
                                                 
3 ML Benade et al. Entrepreneurial Law 3 ed (2003) 281. 
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the small businessman. The Standard Advisory Committee on Company Law 
considered and accepted the proposal.  Pursuant to this acceptance, the legislature was 
tasked with formulating a legal framework which could promote smaller business 
operations4.  The result was the introduction of the CC Act which proved to be an 
important and innovative piece of legislation. This CC Act commenced on the 1st 
January 1985. This piece of legislation was introduced alongside the 1973 Act and 
was specifically designed to facilitate the incorporation of business entities for the 
smaller business owner. 
 
The key principles of the CC Act were simplicity, flexibility, and the ability of 
members to participate in the management and control of their business. Provision 
was further made for the conversion of existing companies into this new close 
corporation vessel5.   The CC Act sought to provide a mechanism for a business entity 
that was less expensive in incorporation and operation.  This was a departure from the 
stringent legal requirements previously imposed.  The close corporation quickly 
became a popular business vehicle which promoted economic growth.   
 




Close corporations were created by the registration of a founding statement. The 
founding statement contains detailed information on the corporation itself and the 
members. For example, the founding statement contained the name of the company 
and the type of business conducted.  The process for registration begins with the 
lodging of the founding statement with the Companies and Intellectual Property 
Commission (CIPC). The CIPC would register the close corporation and each close 
corporation would be issued a registration number.  The Registrar of close 
corporations would then issue a certificate of incorporation and the close corporation 





                                                 
4 ML Benade et al. (note 3 above) 280. 
5 ML Benade et al. (note 3 above) 280. 
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2.2.2 Framework and structure 
 
The close corporation is a juristic person that consists of members.  Each person who 
is in control of the close corporation is called a member of the corporation.  There is a 
restriction on how many members a close corporation may be composed of and that is 
one to ten members. These members form part of the close corporation by owning 
members interest which are expressed as a percentage.  The combined member‘s 
interest constitutes 100 percent.  Natural persons are only permitted to be members 
and no juristic persons may hold members interest.   However, a close corporation is 
allowed to be a shareholder and own shares in a company.   
 
2.2.3 Association agreement 
 
If there is more than one member of the close corporation, the most important 
document for the close corporation, apart from its founding statement, is called an 
association agreement.   The association agreement regulates the relationship between 
the members.  It regulates matters such as the members‘ rights and obligations 
towards each other and towards the close corporation, the percentage of membership 
and any other relevant matter that pertains to the agreements made between the 
members.  It is preferable for members to enter into an association agreement in order 
to regulate the resolution of any issue or dispute that may arise. This agreement can be 
entered into at any time by the members.  However, it is advisable that it is drafted 
and signed before the close corporation is registered. 
 
2.2.4 Legal personality 
 
2.2.4.1 Separate legal personality 
 
As a juristic person, the close corporation is a separate legal entity distinct from its 
members.  Due to the entities separate legal personality, it enjoys the benefits of 
limited liability, perpetual succession, is able to own its own property, is responsible 
for its‘ owns profits, debts or liabilities, and can sue or be sued in its own name. 
 
The separate legal personality of a company is considered the foundation on which 
company law rests.  When a close corporation is formed, a ―veil‖ or a ―curtain‖ hangs 
between the close corporation and its members.  This terminology is purely 
metaphorical and is a means to illustrate the separate existence of the entity.  The 
14 
 
general rule is that the close corporation‘s members cannot be held personally liable 
for the debts of the corporation unless they have signed surety in their personal name.  
A legal ―curtain‖ is drawn between the entity and its members that separate them from 
each other.  This ―curtain‖ is known as the corporate veil. 
 
South Africa‘s common law contains an English law component. South African 
corporate law is heavily influenced by the United Kingdom. A leading United 
Kingdom court case regarding the concept of separate legal personality is 
undoubtedly the landmark case of Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd6.  The facts of this 
case are as follows:- Mr Salomon was a sole trader who had decided to register his 
business as a company with six of his family members. He was the majority 
shareholder of the company whilst the other family members held one nominal share 
each. The company later liquidated and the issue before the court was whether the 
liability of the debts should fall on Mr Salomon in his personal capacity. The House 
of Lords found that Mr Salomon was a separate person from the company and could 
not be held personally liable for the debts of the company. The House noted that:  
 
―once a company is legally incorporated, it must be treated like any other independent person 
with its rights and liabilities appropriated to it; the motives of the promoter of a company 
during the formation of the company are irrelevant when discussing the rights and liabilities 
of such a company‖.7 
 
The House further noted that:  
 
―The company is at law a different person altogether from the subscribers to the 
memorandum, and, though it may be that after incorporation the business is precisely the 
same as it was before, and the same person are managers, and the same hands receive the 
profits, the company is not in law the agent of subscribers or trustee for them.  Nor are the 
subscribers, as members, liable in any shape or form, except to the extent and in the manner 
provided for by the Act."8   
 
                                                 
6 Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd (note 1 above). 
7 Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd (note 1 above) 50. 
8 Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd (note 1 above) 51. 
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This case clearly illustrates the courts recognition of the separate legal identity of a 
juristic person. Once the entity has been incorporated it acquires a separate legal 
personality independent from the natural persons that incorporate it and that manage 
it. 
 
One of South Africa‘s earliest cases dealing with the concept of separate legal 
personality is found in Dadoo Ltd v Krugersdorp Municipality Council9.  In the 
Appellate division it was held that the property of the company belongs solely to the 
company.  It was asserted by Innes CJ that: 
 
―A registered company is a legal persona distinct from the members who compose 
it…Nor is the position affected by the circumstance that a controlling interest in the 
concern may be held by a single member.  This conception of the existence of the 
company as a separate entity distinct from its founders is no merely artificial 
technical thing.  It is a matter of substance; property vested in the company is not, and 
cannot be, regarded as vested in all or any of its members‖.10 
 
 
The separate legal existence of a company was again confirmed in the constitutional 
court case of Airport Cold Storage (Pty) Ltd v Ebrahim11.  The court determined that 
even though a company may not have a physical existence, it is in fact capable of 
owning its assets and also responsible for its liabilities incurred. 
 
2.2.4.2 Limited Liability 
 
As a general rule members are not liable for the debts of the corporation.  The 
members therefore enjoy limited liability whilst the corporation is fully liable for its 
debts. 
 
2.3 Close corporations and the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the 
1996 Constitution) is the supreme law of the Republic and all legislation is subject to 
its provisions.   
                                                 
9 Dadoo Ltd v Krugersdorp Municipality Council 1920 AD. 
10 Ibid 550. 
11 Airport Cold Storage (Pty) Ltd v Ebrahim 2008(2) SA 303 (C).   
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The 1996 Constitution recognises and provides protection to juristic persons, such as 
the close corporation, as provided by Section 8(2) of the 1996 Constitution which 
reads:  
 
―A provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or a juristic person if, and to the 
extent that, it is applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and the nature of 
any duty imposed by the right‖.   
 
What is important to note is that not all of the rights in the Bill of Rights are afforded 
to the juristic person.  An example of such a right is the right to life.  This right cannot 
be claimed by a juristic entity.  However, the right to privacy is applicable to a juristic 
entity.  Section 8(4) of the 1996 Constitution provides that:  
 
―A juristic person is entitled to the rights in the Bill of Rights to the extent required by 
the nature of the rights and the nature of the juristic person‖.   
 
In the Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa12, the 
Constitutional court had to deal with the question of the protection of fundamental 
rights extending to juristic entities.  The court held that:  
 
―Many universally accepted fundamental rights will be fully recognised only if afforded to 
juristic persons as well as natural persons‖.13    
 
It was the court‘s opinion that juristic persons were not afforded the enjoyment of all 
the rights in the Bill of Rights.  Reference was also made that one should take into 
consideration the nature of the juristic entity involved to determine if a particular right 
applied to them.  
 
2.4 The Companies Act 71 of 2008 
 
Since the 1973 Act there had been rapid economic development and growth both 
within South Africa and globally.  South Africa had undergone political changes and a 
                                                 
12 Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (CCT 23/96) [1996] ZACC 
26; 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC); 1996 (10) BCLR 1253 (CC). 
13 Ibid Para 57. 
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new Constitution had been introduced in 1993.  The United Kingdom had also 
undergone rapid changes with the introduction of its new Companies Act in 2006.  In 
addition, the 1973 Act had been amended almost every year since its promulgation.  
This amounted to approximately 42 amendments over 37 years14.  
 
Needless to say, the law had become extremely complex, out-dated and highly 
technical. Over the years corporate law had also introduced a variety of new concepts.  
Among these new concepts were the Solvency and Liquidity test; the introduction of 
corporate governance and accountability, disclosure and transparency; shareholders 
appraisal rights and company rescue.  These concepts desperately needed codification 
to prevent confusion and to provide for a much simpler form of corporate law rules. 
 
Various processes and forums were undertaken during the development and drafting 
of the new 2008 Act.  These included a Government Policy paper published in 2004, 
agreements reached at the National Economic Development and Labour Council and 
opinions of the trade union movement15.  All of these resources proved pivotal in the 
creation of the 2008 Act. This was a positive stance to ensure that the new piece of 
company legislation took practical matters into consideration and the opinions of key 
economic players.  The result was a new approach to company law. The 2008 Act 
came into effect on the 1st May 2011 and repealed certain provisions in the 1973 Act. 
Further amendments were made to the 2008 Act with the Companies Amendment Act 
3 of 2011.   
 
According to the Department of Trade and Industry, ―The Act has been simplified for 
better understanding and application‖16. Familiar language has been used in order to 
ensure consistence and harmonization with other important pieces of legislation such 
as the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000.  There is now extensive 
focus on the transparency and accountability of companies as well as providing for 
less cumbersome regulatory burdens. 
 
                                                 
14 FH Cassim et al. Contemporary Company law 2nd ed (2012) 3. 
15 D Davis et al. Companies and other Business Structures 3rd ed (2013) 8. 
16 Department of Trade and Industry ―The Companies Act‖  available at   
    http://www.sanas.co.za/assessorcon/2011/Presentation%206%20%20Companies%20 Act%20,      
    accessed on 15 October 2014. 
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The 2008 Act signalled an alignment with international corporate law standards and 
now encompassed principles which provided for and governed a variety of new 
business entities.  
 
2.5 The Close Corporation Act 69 of 1984 and the Companies Act 71 of 2008 
 
The 2008 Act adopts a pivotal stance towards the close corporation entity.   The 2008 
Act does not repeal the CC Act in its entirety.  However, the fundamental effect of the 
2008 Act on the CC Act is that no new close corporations were permitted to be 
registered on commencement of Section 13 of the 2008 Act.  Sections 13 of the 2008 
Act reads:  
 
―If a founding statement referred to in section 12 complying with the requirements of 
this Act is lodged with the Registrar in the manner prescribed at any time before 
section 13 of the Companies Act comes into operation, and if the business to be 
carried on by the corporation is lawful, the Registrar shall upon payment of the 
prescribed fee register such statement in his or her registers and shall give notice of 
the registration in the prescribed manner‖. 
 
This section commenced on the 1st May 2011.  Close corporations which were already 
in existence prior to the commencement of the 2008 Act may continue to operate 
indefinitely.   
 
The apparent reason for the decision not to allow new close corporations to be 
registered was that the 2008 Act created a newer, simplistic and efficient company 
structure that still maintained many of the characteristics of the close corporation.  
Consequently, this rendered the need for the close corporation business entity 
unnecessary.   However, based on the huge economic success of the close corporation 
business entity the reason provided is a moot point among scholars and academics17.    
 
The close corporations still in existence will continue to be governed by the CC Act 
and the 2008 Act. The 2008 Act therefore provides for measures for both of these 
Acts to co-exist.  However, various amendments have been implemented to the CC 
Act. 
                                                 




Another notable change to the close corporation brought about by the 2008 Act was 
the provision that allowed for the conversion of companies into close corporations as 
contained in Section 27 of the CC Act.  This provision has now been repealed by 
Schedule 2 of the 2008 Act which now also facilitates the conversion of close 
corporations into companies.  
 
Chapter 3 of the 2008 Act introduces accountability and transparency standards for 
close corporations.  This chapter requires the close corporation to have its annual 
financial statements in line with International Financial Reporting Standards.  
Furthermore, close corporations can now voluntarily comply with the extended 
accountability requirements contained in the 2008 Act including but not limited to 
appointing a company secretary and audit committee.  Chapter 6 of the 2008 Act also 
introduces a new concept into South African corporate law known as Business 
Rescue.  This concept offers assistance to financially distressed companies and also 




The CC indeed has limited liability and a whole host of other rights, as is the case for 
a company under the 2008 Act.  Given the strength of this limited liability, the means 
that SARS may employ to overcome this hurdle will now be considered.  Attention 






















3.  PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL 
 
One of the tools at SARS disposal in its quest to recover the outstanding tax debt of a 
CC from its members is the doctrine of the ‗lifting or piercing of the corporate veil‘.  
This doctrine has both statutory and common law underpinnings.  The nature and 
extent of this doctrine will now be examined in an effort to determine whether it could 
indeed be considered a useful tool for SARS. 
 
3.1 Exceptions to the separate legal personality 
 
As mentioned earlier, the close corporation is a juristic person with a separate legal 
personality that exists independently from its members.  However, this separate legal 
persona is not absolute as in certain circumstances it may be disregarded.  The 
corporate ―veil‖ of the juristic entity will be lifted or pierced and the separate persona 
of the entity will cease to exist.  The result of lifting or piercing may culminate in the 
members of the close corporation losing the protection afforded to them by the juristic 
entity.  Should this happen, the entire company or a particular transaction will be 
viewed in light of the manner in which the members conducted their business 
operations.   
 
In the case of Amlin (SA) Pty Ltd v Van Kooij18 it was stated that: 
 
―piercing the veil necessitates that a court ―opens the curtains‖ of the corporate entity in order 
to see for itself what is obtained inside‖.19 
 
It was discussed further that the focus of the issue under review would shift from the 
close corporation as an entity to the natural person and subsequently the actions of the 
juristic entity would be viewed as the actions of the natural person.  
 
The court noted further that the piercing of the corporate veil would not readily be 
undertaken: 
 
                                                 
18 Amlin (SA) Pty Ltd v Van Kooij 2008 (2) SA 558 (C). 
19 Ibid Para 12. 
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―At common law, piercing the corporate veil is regarded as a drastic remedy that must be 
resorted to sparingly and as a last resort in circumstances where justice will not otherwise be 
done‖.20 
 
In most instances the courts will uphold the separate existence of the juristic entity.  
However, the court will pierce the corporate veil when there are compelling reasons to 
do so. An example of a compelling reason may be when there has been gross 
misconduct with an element of abuse of the separate legal identity of the juristic entity 
by the natural person.  The courts and the legislature have both provided for 
exceptions to the concept of the separate identity of a corporation.   
 
In the case of Ebrahim v Airports Cold Storage21 it was observed that: 
 
―Is an apposite truism that close corporations and companies are imbued with identity only by 
virtue of statue.  In this sense their separate existence remains a figment of law, liable to be 
curtailed or withdrawn when their objects of their creation are abused or thwarted.‖22 
 
The common law doctrines of piercing the corporate veil, as well as statutory 
provisions, are available to those who have been prejudiced by the actions of the 
natural persons who hide behind their corporate entities. 
 
3.2 The Common Law 
 
The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil originated at common law and gained 
considerable interest in the 1980‘s.  It provides that in certain circumstances the court 
is empowered to disregard the principle that the company is a separate juristic entity. 
The metaphor applicable is that the courts can ―lift‖ or ―pierce‖ the corporate veil 
when it is deemed appropriate to do so. 
 
As previously mentioned the South African common law is heavily influenced by 
English company law.  This is the reason why the English case of Salomon v Salomon 
& Co Ltd23  had a considerable influence on South Africa‘s corporate law.   
 
                                                 
20 Ibid Para 23. 
21 Ebrahim v Airports Cold Storage 2009 1 All SA 330 (SCA). 
22 Ibid Para 15. 
23 Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd (note 1 above). 
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There is an abundance of case law illustrating instances whereby the courts have 
disregarded the separate existence of the corporate veil.  However, at common law 
there appears to be no specific guidelines as to when the court will pierce the veil. 
This has tended to be problematic at common law as the courts have not created and 
followed a single comprehensible system for determining when the corporate veil 
should be pierced. 
 
According to Domanski24 there are different categories in which the courts will pierce 
the corporate veil. He claims that judges investigate the natural persons conduct in 
order to apply the veil piercing doctrine. 
 
He states that:  
 
―This piecemeal approach on the part of the courts will, for the sake of convenience, 
be referred to as the ―categorizing approach.‖25   
 
It is his opinion that the various approaches and principles applied in case law have 
resulted in inconsistency and uncertainty in the law. 
 
An examination of a few cases will provide an understanding on the various 
approaches applied by the courts and further illustrate the development of the 
common law doctrine of piercing the corporate veil. 
 
An important case for the judicial affirmation of the doctrine of piercing the corporate 
veil is Lategan & Another NNO v Boyes and Another26. Le Roux J stated quite 
candidly that:  
 
―there was no doubt that our courts would brush aside the veil of corporate identity time and 
again where fraudulent use is made of the fiction of legal personality.‖27  
 
                                                 
24 A Domanski ―Piercing the corporate veil-A New Direction?‖ (1986) SALJ  224-235. 
25 Ibid 224. 
26 Lategan & Another NNO v Boyes and Another 1980 (4) SA 191 (T). 
27 Ibid 201. 
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The court went further to discuss that it is an acceptable practice that in certain 
circumstances the court will disregard the company‘s separate legal personality.  
 
The case of Botha v Van Niekerk en ‘n Ander28 involved a dispute arising from a 
contract for the sale of residential property.  The purchaser Mr Van Niekerk was the 
director and shareholder of a company.  A guarantee for the purchase of the house 
was due by a specific date. The guarantee was not furnished and the seller issued a 
demand for the guarantee.  Mr Van Niekerk claimed that the company had decided to 
replace him as the purchaser. An application was brought by the seller to enforce the 
contract and pierce the corporate veil of the company.  The court refused to pierce the 
corporate veil as it could not arrive at a finding of personal liability of the respondent 
for the amount owed to the seller.  The court formulated a test that required that the 
plaintiff must have suffered ―unconscionable injustice as a result of improper conduct 
on the part of the defendant.‖ 
 
The test applied in the case of Botha v Van Niekerk en ‘n Ander 29 was rejected in the 
case of Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd and Others30 as 
it was deemed to be far too rigid. A more flexible approach was required to be applied 
that would allow for the facts of a particular case to be considered in determining the 
decision whether or not to pierce the corporate veil. It is submitted that the court in 
the case of Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd and Others31 
reached the correct conclusion in that the test formulated in Botha v Van Niekerk en ‘n 
Ander32 was too rigid in its application.  
 
This court laid down a few principles regarding the circumstances in which the veil 
could be pierced.  These principles are not mandatory as the circumstances would 
depend on the facts of the case at hand. The Appellate Division referred to the case of 
Dadoo Ltd and Others v Krugersdorp Municipal Council33 and acknowledged that it 
is trite law that a registered company is considered to be a separate legal person. 
 
                                                 
28 Botha v Van Niekerk en ‘n Ander 1983(3) SA 513(W). 
29 Ibid. 
30 Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd and Others 1995 (4) SA 790 (A).   
31 Ibid. 
32 Botha v Van Niekerk en ‘n Ander (note 28 above). 
33 Dadoo Ltd and Others v Krugersdorp Municipal Council (note 9 above). 
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The court explained further that the concept of lifting the corporate veil entailed that 
our attention shifts from the company to the natural persons standing behind the 
corporation and in control of its activities.  These two parties are viewed as if there 
was no division present in the first place. 
 
The court must uphold the separate legal personality of a corporation unless there are 
circumstances present that would justify the piercing of the corporate veil.  The court 
refers to the principles of ―fraud, dishonesty or other improper conduct‖.  It does not 
matter whether the company was established legitimately and without deceit. What 
matters is that it was misused in manner that amounted to ―fraud, dishonesty or other 
improper conduct‖.  These were the principles applied by the Appellate Division. 
 
The court citing Domanski34 makes reference to the balancing approach in that a 
balance must be adopted between the preservation of the separate legal persona of the 
corporation on the one hand against the policies and principles that favour the 
piercing of the veil on the other.  However, when adopting such an approach the court 
should look to the substance rather than the form of the business operation under 
dispute and the entity as a whole. 
 
In the case of Hülse-Reutter and Others v Gödde35 the Supreme Court of Appeal re-
iterated the fact that the separate legal personality of a corporation must be upheld and 
that the court does not possess a general discretion to simply disregard its separate 
existence when it deems it just to do so.  A stricter approach was adopted in this case 
as the view of the court was that the piercing of the veil should only be used as a tool 
as a last resort.  The court stated that:   
 
―The circumstances in which a court will disregard the distinction between a corporate entity 
and those who control it are far from settled.‖36  
 
The court pointed out further that the piercing of the corporate veil depends on the 
facts of the particular case and that there must be some form of misuse or abuse of the 
                                                 
34 A. Domanski (note 24 above) 224. 
35 Hülse-Reutter and Others v Gödde 2001 (4) SA 1336 (SCA). 
36 Ibid Para 20. 
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distinct corporate identity.  This approach was followed in the case of Amlin Pty Ltd v 
Van Kooij37.  The court referred to veil piercing as a ―drastic remedy‖ that should only 
be used as a last resort38. 
 
In the case of Die Dros (PTY) Ltd and Another v Telefon Beverages cc and Others39 
the issue in dispute involved a restraint of trade clause prohibiting a franchisee of a 
restaurant business from trading.  The court relied on the principles of ―fraud, 
dishonesty or other improper conduct‖ and made reference to the balancing approach 
as discussed in the case of Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) 
Ltd and Others40.  The company was referred to as an ―alter ego‖ and the court 
explained that it was trite law that the courts would allow the separate legal identity of 
a close corporation to be pierced when there has been a breach of a restraint of trade 
provision:  
 
―Courts permit the separate corporate personality of a close corporation or company to be 
disregarded where a natural person who is subject to a restraint of trade uses the corporation 
as a front to engage in the activity that has been prohibited by an agreement in a restraint of 
trade.41‖ 
 
Another example where the court had to deal with the abuse of a corporate structure is 
the case of Airport Cold Storage (Pty) Limited v Ebrahim and Others42.  The facts of 
the case are as follows: 
 
Airport Cold Storage was a company that traded in meat products and frozen 
vegetables.  They provided an account basis to a close corporation that traded as 
Global foods.  This corporation was placed under provisional liquidation and owed 
the company a large sum of money.  After the company was unable to prove their 
claim they sought to pierce the corporate veil and hold the parties personally liable for 
the debt.   
                                                 
37 Amlin Pty Ltd v Van Kooij (note 18 above).   
38 M Henkeman ―Piercing the Corporate Veil‖ Schoeman Tshaka Attorneys available at 
http://www.polity.org.za/article/piercing-the-corporate- veil-2014-04-10, accessed on 17 April 2014. 
39 Die Dros (PTY) Ltd and Another v Telefon Beverages cc and Others (3413/02) [2002] ZAWCHC . 
40 Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd and Others (note 30 above). 
41 Die Dros (PTY) Ltd and Another v Telefon Beverages cc and Others (note 39 above) Para 24. 




Turning to the subject of piercing the corporate veil, the court held that it possesses no 
general discretion to simply disregard the existence of the separate corporate identity 
whenever it deems it just to do so.  However, they acknowledged that this would be 
the case, ―only where special circumstances exist indicating that it is a mere façade 
concealing the true facts.‖43  The court cited fraud as a special circumstance as well as 
not treating the entity as a separate identity. 
 
The court held that the parties did not manage the corporation as a separate juristic 
entity and in fact on numerous occasions did not treat the corporation as a separate 
identity. They further did not comply with the statutory requirements necessary in 
order to operate a corporation and in fact were found to have traded recklessly.  There 
had been gross abuse of the juristic personality of the corporation. The court found the 
defendants jointly and severally liable for the debt incurred by the close corporation. 
 
According to Cassim44 it is best that we do not have a categorising approach:  
    
―The rejection of a categorising approach is commendable because categorising could 
lead to uncertainty in our law as categories do not constitute an exhaustive list of 
instances in which the corporate veil will be pierced and the authorities tend to differ 
on the applicable categories.‖45 
 
A complete codification of rules generally leads to inflexibility in the law.  Courts 
will not be permitted to develop new categories and principles so that veil piercing 
doctrine will not be able to develop further.  Cassim46 further discusses that the 
overlapping of categories could easily occur given the various types of circumstances 
that could arise in a particular case.  Furthermore, in the interest of justice a matter 
could urgently require the corporate identity to be pierced.  However, if no correlating 
category exists for the piercing of the veil in that particular instance then the court 
will not be permitted to do so.  
 
It is submitted that a partial codification of the categorising approach is advisable 
given the importance of the veil piercing doctrine.  This would allow for the further 
                                                 
43 Ibid 25. 
44 FH Cassim et al. (note 14 above) 43.  
45 FH Cassim et al. (note 14 above) 43. 
46 FH Cassim et al. (note 14 above) 43. 
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development of the law and provide for a basis from which the courts could work 
from. 
 
The courts have not followed consistent principles with its determination of whether 
or not to pierce the corporate veil.  The result is that the common law has not reached 
a position whereby there is a certainty that the courts will adopt the veil piercing 
doctrine.  It is clear from the common law approach that the veil piercing doctrine is 
an exceptional remedy to be used as a last resort and that compelling reasons must 
exist before the corporate veil will be pierced. 
 
This was re-iterated in the case of Amlin (SA) Pty Ltd v Van Kooij47 where the court 
stated that:  
 
―piercing the veil is a drastic remedy. It therefore should be resorted to sparingly and as a 
measure of last resort, in circumstances where justice will not otherwise be done between two 
litigants.‖48 
 
3.3 The Legislative Framework 
 
Throughout the years legislatures have attempted to provide statutory guidelines for 
the veil piercing doctrine in order to create a more concrete and visible rule of law.  
This was evident with the introduction of the 1973 Act and the CC Act.   
 
The development of these statutory guidelines has culminated in the codification of 
the veil piercing doctrine for the first time in South African company law in Section 
20(9) of the 2008 Act.  The 2008 Act has adopted the common law doctrine of 
piercing the corporate veil.  Statutory provisions and guidelines for the veil piercing 
doctrine clearly demonstrate that the separate legal personality of a juristic entity is 
not absolute. 
 
3.3.1 Companies Act 61 of 1973 
 
It is important to note that a fundamental aspect of corporate legislation is that of the 
transparency of the internal happenings of the company. This is evident in various 
                                                 
47 Amlin (SA) Pty Ltd v Van Kooij (note 18 above). 
48 Amlin (SA) Pty Ltd v Van Kooij (note 18 above) Para 23. 
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sections of the 1973 Act such as the requirement that the articles of association of the 
company be placed with the Registrar of Companies and the disclosure of the 
financial position of the company in its annual audited accounts.   
 
Transparency is further enhanced by the legislatures providing statutory guidelines for 
the veil piercing doctrine in the text of the 1973 Act.  
 
An important provision that has been repealed by the 2008 Act is Section 424 of the 
1973 Act.  However this section may still find application if it falls within the 
transitional provisions provided for in Schedule 5 of the 2008 Act.  Section 424 is 
titled ―Liability of directors and others for fraudulent conduct of business‖.   This 
provision is drafted in extremely wide terms. 
 
Section 424(1) reads as follows:  
 
―When it appears, whether it be in a winding-up, judicial management or otherwise, 
that any business of the company was or is being carried on recklessly or with intent 
to defraud creditors of the company or creditors of any other person or for any 
fraudulent purpose, the Court may, on the application of the Master, the liquidator, the 
judicial manager, any creditor or member or contributory of the company, declare that 
any person who was knowingly a party to the carrying on of the business in the 
manner aforesaid, shall be personally responsible, without any limitation of liability, 
for all or any of the debts or other liabilities of the company as the Court may direct.‖ 
 
This section was available to the unpaid creditors of a company against any person 
that conducted ―reckless trading‖ or acted in a manner with ―intent to defraud its 
creditors‖.   The principle elements were ―reckless trading‖ or ―intent to defraud‖. 
 
A causal link had to be proved between the element of the action of the reckless 
conduct and the loss suffered by the creditors.  Further to this, the person that acted in 
this manner had to ―knowingly be a party‖ to the action.  This entailed an element of 
intent required on the part of this person. 
 
In the case of Philotex (Pty) Ltd and others v Snyman and others49 the court had no 
problem with finding the directors of the company personally responsible for the 
repayment of the company‘s debts. The court ruled that: 
                                                 




―a director who trades "recklessly" is one who permits the company to continue to trade 
where there is no reasonable prospect of payment of creditors' debts.‖50  
 
This case created the precedent that a director who allows a company to trade whilst 
knowing that the company will not be able to pay its creditors may be held personally 
liable for all the debts of the company. 
 
In the case of Fourie NO and others v Newton51 the appellants were liquidators of a 
company and they sought to hold the respondent personally liable for the debts of the 
company under Section 424 of the 2008 Act.  It was discussed how the test for 
recklessness has both a subjective and objective element.  It was held that:  
 
―Acting ―recklessly‖ consists in a failure to give consideration to the consequences of one‘s 
actions, or in an attitude of reckless disregard of such consequences.‖52  
 
The court was unable to find the respondent personally liable according to the 
statutory test.  This case demonstrates the difficulty in convincing a court to apply 
Section 424(1). 
 
3.3.2   Close Corporation Act 69 of 1984 
 
The legislatures attempted to provide further codified guidelines for piercing the 
corporate veil in the CC Act. A few important provisions are set out hereunder: 
 
Section 26 of the CC Act has been substituted by section 224(2) of the 2008 Act.  
This section applied to the deregistration of a close corporation.  Section 26(5) read as 
follows:  
 
―If a corporation is deregistered while having outstanding liabilities, the persons who 
are members of such corporation at the time of deregistration shall be jointly and 
severally liable for such liabilities‖.   
 
                                                 
50 Ibid. 
51 Fourie NO and others v Newton [2011] 2 All SA 265 (SCA). 
52 Ibid Para 29. 
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This section provided for the liability of the members of the close corporation for any 
outstanding debt that the close corporation may have following it‘s deregistration.  
Although this provision was not directly a veil piercing provision as the close 
corporation would no longer exist due to its de-registration, it nevertheless allowed 
for the liability of the members for any outstanding debt. 
 
Section 43 is titled ―Liability of members for negligence‖, paragraph 1 states as 
follows:  
 
―A member of a corporation shall be liable to the corporation for loss caused by his or 
her failure in the carrying on of the business of the corporation to act with the degree 
of care and skill that may reasonably be expected from a person of his or her 
knowledge and experience.‖  
 
 
According to this section if a member acted negligently and due to this negligence the 
close corporation suffered a loss, the member could be held personally liable by the 
close corporation for any damages that the close corporation had suffered because of 
such negligence.  The member would be deemed to have acted negligently if he or she 
did not act with the degree of care and skill that may be reasonably expected from a 
person with his or her knowledge and experience.   
 
Section 63 is titled ―Joint liability for debts of corporation‖ provides for 
circumstances as per paragraph (a) – (h) whereby if the members of the corporation 
have abused their position they will be held jointly and severally liable for the debts 
of the corporation. 
 
Section 64 has been substituted by section 224(2) of the 2008 Act. This section was 
titled ―Liability for reckless or fraudulent carrying-on of business of Corporation‖ 
Section 64(1) read as follows: - 
 
―If it at any time appears that any business of a corporation was or is being carried on 
recklessly, with gross negligence or with intent to defraud any person or for any 
fraudulent purpose, a Court may on the application of the Master, or any creditor, 
member or liquidator of the corporation, declare that any person who was knowingly 
a party to the carrying on of the business in any such manner, shall be personally 
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liable for all or any of such debts or other liabilities of the corporation as the Court 
may direct, and the Court may give such further orders as it considers proper for the 
purpose of giving effect to the declaration and enforcing that liability.‖ 
 
In the case Ebrahim v Airports Cold Storage (Pty) Limited53 the application of Section 
64 was dealt with.  Cameron JA explained the principle of ―recklessly‖ as follows: 
 
―Acting ‗recklessly‘consists in ‗an entire failure to give consideration to the consequences of 
one‘s actions, in other words, an attitude of reckless disregard of such consequences‘.  In 
applying the recklessness test to the running of a close corporation, the Court should have 
regard to amongst other things the corporation‘s scope of operations, the members‘ roles, 
functions and powers, the amount of the debts, the extent of the financial difficulties and the 
prospects of recovery, plus the particular circumstances of the claim ‗and the extent to which 
the [member] has departed from the standards of a reasonable man in regard thereto‘54. 
 
The labour court case of Zeman v Quickelberge and Another55 provides further 
illustration of the application of section 64.  In this case the issue under review was 
that the respondent had made a disposition without value.   The court had to determine 
if the sale was concluded with a fraudulent purpose which amounted to an abuse of 
the corporate personality.  The court gave an insightful definition of lifting the 
corporate veil: 
 
―Lifting the corporate veil means disregarding the dichotomy between a company and a 
natural person behind it and attributing liability to that person where he has misused or abused 
the principle of corporate personality.‖56    
 
The court discussed further that as a general rule there needs to be an element of fraud 
or other improper conduct.  Reference was made to the case of Botha v Van Niekerk 57 
which required the element of ―unconscionable injustice‖.  This test was regarded as 
being far too rigid when determining the application of piercing of the corporate veil.  
The causal link was established and the application of section 64 was confirmed. 
 
Section 65 titled ―Powers of Court in case of abuse of separate juristic personality of 
Corporation‖, permits a court to deem a close corporation not to be a juristic person.    
                                                 
53 Ebrahim v Airports Cold Storage (Pty) Limited (note 11 above). 
54 Ebrahim v Airports Cold Storage (Pty) Limited (note 11 above)  Para 14. 
55 Zeman v Quickelberge and Another (C45/2010) [2010] ZALC 122; 2011) 32 ILJ 453 (LC). 
56 Ibid Para 41. 
57 Botha v Van Niekerk en ‘n Ander (note 28 above). 
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It reads as follows:  
 
―Whenever a Court on application by an interested person, or in any proceedings in 
which a corporation is involved, finds that the incorporation of, or any act by or on 
behalf of, or any use of, that corporation, constitutes a gross abuse of the juristic 
personality of the corporation as a separate entity, the Court may declare that the 
corporation is to be deemed not to be a juristic person in respect of such rights, 
obligations or liabilities of the corporation, or of such member or members thereof, or 
of such other person or persons, as are specified in the declaration, and the Court may 
give such further order or orders as it may deem fit in order to give effect to such 
declaration.‖ 
 
This section therefore provides that if an act by a close corporation constitutes a gross 
abuse of its juristic personality, an interested person can approach the court to invoke 
Section 65.  The court can declare that the corporation is deemed not to be a juristic 
person and can issue a further order to give effect to that declaration, such as that its 
members are personally liable for its debts.    
 
There are numerous cases illustrating the application of Section 65. In the case of 
Haygro Catering BK v Van der Merwe58 the name of the close corporation had not 
been displayed on the close corporation‘s business premises, correspondence and 
other applicable documents.  This was in contravention of Section 23 of the CC Act.  
The court found that this failure amounted to a gross abuse of the separate juristic 
personality of the corporation as contained in Section 65.    
 
In the case of TJ Jonck BJ h/a Bothaville Vleismark v Du plessis59 a member of a 
close corporation made loans to the corporation having full knowledge that the 
business was in fact insolvent.  As security for his loans he authorised the registering 
of a notarial bond over the movable property of the close corporation.  He then 
proceeded to obtain an order entitling him to take possession of the movable property. 
 
                                                 
58 Haygro Catering BK v Van der Merwe 1996 (4) SA 1063 (c). 
59 TJ Jonck BJ h/a Bothaville Vleismark v Du plessis NO 1998 (1) SA 971 (O). 
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His motive was to acquire ownership of the business assets in his name thereby 
preventing the business creditors from proving any claim.  He continued to conduct 
business as usual under a new name, from the same premises and using the same 
equipment and stock that previously belonged to the corporation.  The court found 
that the member was personally liable for the debts in terms of Section 64 of the CC 
Act, which deemed the member to have carried on business ―recklessly, with gross 
negligence or for any fraudulent purposes‖.   
 
The court went further and held that the plaintiff could also succeed in terms of 
Section 65 of the CC Act as the member‘s actions had constituted a gross abuse of the 
juristic personality of the close corporation.  
 
The most recently reported judgement on piercing the corporate veil is the High Court 
case of Basfour 121 CC v M & R Interior Concepts60.  In this case the close 
corporation, who operated as a building company, had agreed to carry out alterations 
and renovations to the plaintiff‘s property. The plaintiff had already paid the close 
corporation R3 million for the repair work.   The corporation failed to do the repair 
work as agreed and eventually abandoned the building site.  
 
The plaintiff instituted a claim for damages of R2 million due to the breach of 
contract.  However, by this time the close corporation had become insolvent.  The 
plaintiff therefore applied to the court to have the individual members of the close 
corporation deemed to be personally liable for the damages sustained61. 
 
The court found in favour of the plaintiff and declared that in terms of section 65 of 
the CC Act that the close corporation was deemed not to be a juristic person thereby 




                                                 
60 Basfour 121 CC v M & R Interior Concepts [2015] ZAWCHC 44. 
61 Unknown ―The art of law – piercing the corporate veil now depends on a value judgment by the 





3.3.3   Companies Act 71 of 2008 
 
The commencement of the 2008 Act saw the introduction of a statutory provision for 
the first time in South African corporate law that permits the piercing of the corporate 
veil of a juristic entity.   
 
Section 20(9) of the 2008 Act reads as follows: 
 
―If, on application by an interested person or in any proceedings in which a company 
is involved, a court finds that the incorporation of the company, any use of the 
company, or any act by or on behalf of the company, constitutes an unconscionable 
abuse of the juristic personality of the company as a separate entity, the court may –   
(a) declare that the company is to be deemed not to be a juristic person in respect of 
any right, obligation or liability of the company or of a shareholder of the company 
or, in the case of a non-profit company, a member of the company, or of another 
person specified in the declaration; and 
(b) make any further order the court considers appropriate to give effect to a 
declaration contemplated in paragraph (a).‖ 
 
This section gives a court the general statutory discretion to disregard the separate 
legal personality of a company and to pierce the corporate veil on application by an 
―interested person‖ in instances where there has been an ―unconscionable abuse‖ of 
the juristic personality of the company as a separate entity.  However, the 2008 Act 
has failed to define the terms ―interested person‖ and ―unconscionable abuse‖ and 
have not provided any guidance as to what circumstances and facts will constitute 
―unconscionable abuse‖.  It appears as though it has been left to the discretion of the 
courts to provide clarity and direction on the meaning and scope of these wide terms. 
 
It was submitted in an article by Cassim62 that Section 20(9) of the 2008 Act 
contained uncertainties regarding its interpretation and scope.  The following 
uncertainties were highlighted in this article:- the meaning of the term 
‗unconscionable abuse‘;  whether Section 20(9) overrides the common law instances 
                                                 
62 R. Cassim, ―Piercing the Corporate Veil: ―Unconscionable abuse under the Companies Act 71 of 
2008‖ De Rebus (2012) 2. 
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of piercing the corporate veil;  whether piercing of the veil is still to be regarded as an 
exceptional remedy that may be used only as a last resort; and  who an ‗interested 
person‘ would be under Section 20(9). 
 
No corresponding provisions exist for Section 20(9) of the 2008 Act in the 1973 Act.  
However, when compared to the CC Act, in particular Section 65, it appears as 
though it has been drafted verbatim63.   The difference between the provisions of the 
CC Act and the 2008 Act is the element of abuse required to be proved.   The CC Act 
requires the element of ―gross abuse‖ to be proved and the 2008 Act requires a lower 
standard of abuse, being ―unconscionable abuse‖. 
 
The test for piercing the corporate veil as set out in section 20(9) of the 2008 Act 
focuses only on the abuse of the juristic personality of the company as a separate 
entity and on whether this abuse constitutes unconscionable abuse. 
 
The term ―interested person‖ in section 20(9) of the 2008 Act bears a similarity to the 
contents of section 65 of the CC Act.  The court in the case of TJ Jonck BK h/a 
Bothaville Vleismark v Du Plessis NO en ‘n Ander64 examined the meaning of  the 
phrase ―any interested person‖ in the context of section 65 of the CC Act.  The court 
came to the conclusion that this interest is limited to a financial interest or monetary 
interest such as that held by a creditor. Therefore, a creditor could be deemed as being 
an interested person who could bring an application in terms of Section 20(9) of the 
2008 Act65. 
 
The first case that dealt with the application of Section 20(9) of the 2008 Act is the 
Western Cape High Court case of Ex parte Stephen Malcolm Gore NO and 37 others 
NO66. 
 
This case dealt with the interpretation and scope of Section 20(9) and its application 
to the facts of the case. The court had to decide if it should pierce the corporate veil of 
a group of companies that consisted of one holding company and various subsidiary 
                                                 
63 FH Cassim et al. (note 14 above) 57 . 
64 TJ Jonck BK h/a Bothaville Vleismark v Du Plessis NO en ‘n Ander (note 59 above). 
65 FH Cassim et al. (note 14 above) 59. 
66 Ex parte Stephen Malcolm Gore NO and 37 others NO (2013) 2 All SA 437 (WCC). 
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companies in circumstances where there had been a blatant disregard for the entity‘s 
individual existence.  
 
The applicants in this matter were the liquidators of 41 companies that formed part of 
a group of companies called ―the King Group‖.  The three King Brothers were 
directors and majority shareholders of the holding company known as King Financial 
Holdings Limited (KFH) and most of its subsidiary companies. 
 
The order that the liquidators sought was an order where the separate personality of 
some of the subsidiary companies would be disregarded in order for their residual 
assets to be treated as the assets of the holding company which was also in 
liquidation.  The purpose of this event would ensure that the investor‘s claims could 
be paid. 
 
The basis for this application was that the liquidators claimed that the controllers of 
the various companies had treated the group of companies in such a manner that they 
could not establish which corporate entities the investors and creditors could prove 
their claims from.  The group‘s business operations were conducted with a complete 
disregard for the distinguishing identities of the different business entities. 
 
The liquidators made an application to the court under the common law alternatively 
in terms of section 20(9) to pierce the corporate veil of the subsidiary companies. 
 
The liquidators were deemed to be ―interested persons‖ as they had a direct and valid 
interest in the matter and the relief that they sought.   It is submitted that Section 65 of 
the CC Act coupled with the case of TJ Jonck BK h/a Bothaville Vleismark v Du 
Plessis NO en ‘n Ander67 provided authority for the interpretation of ―interested 
persons‖ contained in Section 20(9) of the 2008 Act. 
 
 The court in Ex parte Stephen Malcolm Gore NO68 had no hesitation in finding that 
the King Group had indeed operated their business activities as if they were trading 
under one holding company.   A clear example was that investor‘s funds had been 
                                                 
67 TJ Jonck BK h/a Bothaville Vleismark v Du Plessis NO en ‘n Ander (note 59 above). 
68 Ex parte Stephen Malcolm Gore NO (note 66 above). 
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transferred by the controllers of the holding company between the various companies 
with no regard for the actual identity of each individual company involved.  Such 
funds were allocated by the controllers into whichever company they deemed fit.  
Further to this, no proper accounting records were kept and maintained. 
 
The court made the order in terms of Section 20(9) and declared that the subsidiary 
companies were deemed to not be juristic persons as there had been an 
―unconscionable abuse‖ of their separate identity.  
 
The court referred to a variety of sources in its judgement such as case law both 
locally and abroad as well as articles and scholar‘s such as Cassim69. It appears from 
this judgement that a wide interpretation of the words ―unconscionable abuse‖ was 
adopted by the court. This case also set a lower standard of abuse as what is required 
under Section 65 of the CC Act. Section 65 of the CC Act uses the term ―Gross 
Abuse‖ whilst Section 20(9) of the 2008 Act only requires ―unconscionable abuse‖.  
 
The court also dealt with the question of whether Section 20(9) overrides the common 
law doctrine of piercing the corporate veil.  It was explained that this section was 
supplementary not substitutive and therefore does not override the common law 
doctrine.  The court stated further that the common law doctrine would be used as a 
tool for guidance when interpreting this section. 
 
This court case is extremely important in the context of the topic of piercing the 
corporate veil.  This notorious remedy that has been inconsistently applied throughout 
the years by our courts has finally received a thorough analysis.   In addition the case 
of Ex parte Stephen Malcolm Gore NO and 37 others NO70 has now dealt with the 
interpretation and application of Section 20(9) of the 2008 Act for the first time. 
 
It appears quite clear that the legal basis upon which the courts are prepared to pierce 
the corporate veil under the common law have now been extended under Section 
20(9) of the 2008 Act.   This provision introduces a new direction to the remedy of 
piercing the corporate veil. Further, the common law principles of piercing the veil 
                                                 
69 FH Cassim et al. (note 14 above). 
70 Ex parte Stephen Malcolm Gore NO and 37 others NO (note 66 above). 
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have not been replaced with this section, but still serve as an important and useful 
guideline when interpreting prevailing legislation.  Judging by the case of Ex parte 
Stephen Malcolm Gore NO and 37 others NO71  this new statutory remedy could 
possibly see this previously vexatious topic as being more successfully dealt with in 
the future. 
 
3.4 The Distinction between Piercing the Veil and Lifting the Veil 
 
Although the courts sometimes do not differentiate between the concepts of ―piercing 
the veil‖ and ―lifting the veil‖, a distinction does exist.  When the courts pierce the 
corporate veil of an entity they are metaphorically removing the protective curtain 
between the juristic entity and its members.  The corporation‘s actions and or 
liabilities are then treated as if they were the member‘s actions and or liabilities.   
 
In contrast the phrase ―lifting the corporate veil‖ means that the courts are looking 
behind the metaphorical curtain and taking into account the identity of the members 
of the corporation.  It does not necessarily mean that they are treating the 
corporation‘s actions and or liabilities as those of its members. 
  
Judge Staughton in the case of Atlas Maritime Co SA -v- Avalon Maritime Ltd (the 
Coral Rose)72, discussed the distinction:- 
 
―Like all metaphors, this phrase (Piercing the corporate veil) can sometimes obscure 
reasoning rather than elucidate it.  There are, I think, two senses in which it is used, 
which need to be distinguished.  To pierce the corporate veil is an expression that I 
would reserve for treating the rights or liabilities or activities of a company as the 
rights or liabilities or activities of its shareholders.  To lift the corporate veil or look 
behind it, on the other hand, should mean to have regard to the shareholding in a 
company for some legal purpose‖.73  
 
Similarly in the case of Pioneer Concrete Services Ltd v Yelnah Pty Ltd74 the court 
commented on its ability to sometimes ―look behind the legal personality to the real 
controllers.‖75   
 
                                                 
71 Ex parte Stephen Malcolm Gore NO and 37 others NO (note 66 above). 
72 Atlas Maritime Co SA -v- Avalon Maritime Ltd (the Coral Rose) (No 1); CA 1991. 
73 Ibid 779. 
74 Pioneer Concrete Services Ltd v Yelnah Pty Ltd (1986) 5 NSWLR. 
75 Ibid 264. 
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In the labour court of South Africa in the case of Zeman v Quickelberge and 
Another76, acting Judge Nicholson stated that: 
 
―the general principle underlying the lifting of the corporate veil is that when a 
corporation is the mere alter ego or business conduit of a person it may be 
disregarded. While the corporate veil is normally lifted to identify the shareholders or 
individuals who are the true perpetrators of a company‘s acts.‖77 
 
There is a distinction between the topics of ―Piercing the corporate veil‖ and ―Lifting 




Having seen the nature and extent of the doctrine of lifting or piercing the corporate 
veil in South African law, it may be concluded that there is no reason why, under the 
appropriate circumstances, SARS cannot employ this doctrine to, for example, hold 
the members of a close corporation liable for the tax debts of that corporation.  
However, the particular circumstances necessary for the operation of the doctrine, at 
either common law or in terms of statute, as outlined above, would have to be present 
before the doctrine operated.  This might serve to limit the circumstances in which 
SARS may be successful.  It is thus necessary to broaden the enquiry, to examine how 




















                                                 
76 Zeman v Quickelberge and Another (C45/2010) [2010] ZALC 122; 2011) 32 ILJ 453 (LC). 





4. TAXATION  
 
Before one can embark on an examination of the specific provisions in tax law that 
permit SARS to ‗lift or pierce the corporate veil‘ it is necessary to examine the 
background to the taxation system in South Africa.  This chapter shall contain a brief 
overview of how CC‘s are taxed and the legislative framework governing tax 
administration in South Africa. 
 
4.1 Taxation in South Africa 
 
In 1789 Benjamin Franklin wrote, ―In this world nothing can be said to be certain, 
except death and taxes.‖78  Finance for public expenditure is largely reliant on 
taxation. Taxes are a compulsory transfer of finance from individuals or business 
entities to a country‘s government.  If Individuals or business entities receive revenue 
in a particular country they have to pay taxes to that country‘s government.  It is 
compulsory and legally enforceable to pay taxes. 
 
Tax systems evolve through time and new taxes are introduced and others are 
amended.  A good tax system is primarily based on the premise that it must generate 
sufficient revenue to finance the government‘s budget expenditure.  A good tax 
system must also comply with the concepts of equity, economic efficiency, 
administrative efficiency and flexibility79. 
 
South Africa has a well-developed and regulated taxation regime with laws that are 
constantly being revised and amended to keep them relevant.  The tax regime is set by 
the National Treasury and enforced by the South African Revenue Service 
(hereinafter referred to as SARS).  SARS is headed by the Commissioner for the 
South African Revenue Service (hereinafter referred to as the Commissioner).  SARS 
is created by the South African Revenue Service Act 34 of 1997 and is an 
autonomous organ of the state operating outside of the public service, but within the 
public administration.  Therefore, South Africa‘s tax regime is set by the National 
Treasury and is managed by SARS.  SARS is also responsible for the collection of 
                                                 
78 JM Cohen The Penguin Dictionary of Quotations (1960). 
79 Black, Calitz & Steenekamp Public Economics 6 ed  (2015) 215. 
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taxes.  The Minister of Finance presents a Budget annually which outlines the total 
government expenditure for the following financial year and the manner in which this 
expenditure will be financed80. 
 
South Africa has a progressive income taxation system which is based on the system 
that the wealthy should contribute a greater portion than those of lower income 
groups. This means that the more a person earns the higher percentage tax they 
ultimately end up paying81.  The tax equity principle was explained best by the United 
Nations author Mr Adam Smith in ―The Wealth of Nations‖82.  He stated that: 
 
―The subjects of every state ought to contribute towards the support of the 
government, as nearly as possible, in proportion to their respective abilities; that is, in 
proportion to the revenue which they respectively enjoy under the protection of the 
state.‖83 
 
Taxes can be classified in many ways.  South Africa uses the classification that 
conforms to the International Monetary Fund‘s Government Finance Statistics 
Manual which was published in 2001.  Tax revenue within South Africa is divided 
into six main categories: Taxes on income and profits; Taxes on payroll and 
workforce; Taxes on property; Domestic taxes on goods and services; Taxes on 
international trade and transactions; and Stamp duties and fees84. The six categories 
are further sub-divided into various types of taxes.   
 
South Africa‘s taxation system is determined by laws that are administered by the 
Commissioner.  Important tax legislation in South Africa are but not limited to: the 
Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 (hereinafter referred to as the ―Income Tax Act‖); the 
Value Added Tax Act 89 of 1991 (hereinafter referred to as the ―Vat Act‖); the 
Customs and Excise Act 91 of 1964 (hereinafter referred to as the ―Customs Excise 
                                                 
80 SARS ―SA‘s Tax System‖ available at 
http://www.sars.gov.za/About/SATaxSystem/Pages/default.aspx, accessed on 12 July 2013. 
81 SARS ―SA‘s Tax System‖ available at 
http://www.sars.gov.za/About/SATaxSystem/Pages/default.aspx, accessed on 12 July 2013. 
82 A Smith The Wealth of Nations  (1776). 
83 A Smith (note 82 above) Ch 2. 
84 Black, Calitz & Steenekamp ( note 61 above) 211. 
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Act‖); the Estate Duty Act 45 of 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the ―Estate Duty 
Act‖); and the Tax Admin Act. 
 
To determine what amount is taxable from a natural or juristic person‘s gross income 
in South Africa the amount must be calculated using the gross income formulae. The 
definition of gross income can be found in Section 1 of the Income Tax Act.   
 
Section 1 states that: 
 
―gross income‖, in relation to any year or period of assessment, means—(i) in the case 
of any resident, the total amount, in cash or otherwise, received by or accrued to or in 
favour of such resident; or 
 
(ii) in the case of any person other than a resident, the total amount, in cash or 
otherwise, received by or accrued to or in favour of such person from a source within 
the Republic, during such year or period of assessment, excluding receipts or accruals 
of a capital nature.‖ 
 
The terms contained in section 1 of the Income Tax Act are not defined.  This has 
given rise to interpretive difficulties.  There have been a variety of cases that have 
assisted with the interpretation of this section.  Lace Proprietary Mines Ltd v CIR85, 
Lategan v CIR86, CIR V Geldenhuys87 and MP Finance Group V CSARS88 are 
examples of such landmark cases. 
 
Case law plays an integral role in interpreting tax legislation in South Africa. Many 
provisions in the various tax acts are not defined or are simply unclear or ambiguous.  
Therefore, South Africa has an abundance of tax case law that forms an integral role 





                                                 
85 Lace Proprietary Mines Ltd v CIR 1983 ad 269. 
86 Lategan v CIR (1926) , CPD 203, 2 SATC 16. 
87 CIR V Geldenhuys 1947(3) SA256(C)14SATC 419. 
88 MP Finance Group V CSARS 2007 SCA 69 SATC 141. 
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4.2 Taxation of Corporations  
 
The 2008 Act does not permit the registration of new close corporations.  However, 
existing close corporations that have already been incorporated remain valid and still 
operate.  Therefore, close corporations are subject to taxation as determined by the 
prevailing legislation.   
 
A close corporation is a separate legal entity and must register for Income Tax and 
can register for Value Added tax.  It must lodge tax returns timeously otherwise it will 
be deregistered by the CIPC89. 
 
Close corporations in operation create revenue and are therefore subject to the Income 
Tax Act. A close corporation is defined in the Income Tax Act, Paragraph 1(f), as a 
company. Section 38 of the Income Tax Act is titled ―Classification of companies‖.  
Section 38(2)(b) of the Income Tax Act provides that a close corporation is regarded 
as being a private company for the purposes of taxation. The revenue derived from a 
close corporation is taxed at the same rate as a company which is 28%90. 
 
Employees tax is payable for amounts paid to the directors of private companies.  
According to Section 1 of the Income Tax Act every person who is involved in the 
management of the close corporation is regarded as being a director for tax purposes. 
A close corporation is also a provisional tax payer as per the Fourth Schedule 
Paragraph 1(b) of the Income Tax Act.    
 
The distribution of profits made by a corporation to its members is called dividends.  
Dividends are subject to dividends tax and exempt from normal tax as provided in 
Section 10(1)(k)(i).  However, the close corporation is responsible for the withholding 







                                                 
89 N Prinsloo ―Close corporations: An introduction‖ available at 
https://www.findanaccountant.co.za/content_close-corporation, accessed on 12 July 2013. 
90 M Stiglingh et al. Silke: South African Income Tax (2013) 492. 
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4.3 The Tax Administration Act 28 of 2011   
 
The term ―Tax Administration‖ refers to the process taken by an individual or entity 
to register for tax.  This is then followed by the submission of tax returns, assessment 
of tax and consequential payment of the tax liability due91. 
 
The Tax Administration of South Africa is regulated by legislation.  Previously the 
provisions for tax administration were contained in various tax acts.   
 
October 2012 saw the commencement of the highly anticipated Tax Admin Act.  The 
purpose of the Act is to consolidate all tax legislation relating to the administration 
and enforcement of the various tax Acts into one single Act.  The stated objectives of 
the Tax Admin Act are to achieve a balance between the powers and duties of SARS 
on the one hand and the rights and obligations of the taxpayer on the other hand.  The 
Tax Admin Act calls for a transparent relationship between the SARS authorities and 
the taxpayer.  The Tax Admin Act applies to everyone who is liable to pay tax 
whether personally or on behalf of another person.  The introduction of the Tax 
Admin Act resulted in several provisions of the Income Tax Act being repealed and 
replaced by corresponding provisions in the Tax Admin Act.  The Act aims to align 
the administration of the various tax Acts where practically possible92.  
 
The Tax Admin Act contains a number of provisions already familiar to the taxpayer 
due to previous fiscal statutes.  However, a number of provisions have also been 
modified and entirely new provisions have been introduced into the Act.  These new 
provision include but are not limited to: criminal investigations, searches conducted 
without a warrant, SARS audit and feedback procedures, grounds of assessment, 
voluntary disclosure and the procedure for obtaining tax clearance certificates.  It has 
been stated that when drafting the Tax Admin Act the Commissioner took into 




                                                 
91 M Stiglingh et al. (note 90 above) 1109. 
92  M Stiglingh et al. (note 90 above) 1109. 
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4.4 Dispute Resolution and the Legal framework for Taxation 
 
A taxpayer that feels unjustly aggrieved by a decision or assessment of SARS has 
various options of recourse at his or her disposal.   
 
Should a taxpayer wish to dispute an assessment raised by SARS he or she can firstly 
request reasons for the assessment as contained in Rule 3 of the Rules of the Tax 
Court.  Should the taxpayer accept the reasons furnished by SARS, then no further 
steps shall be taken.  However, should the taxpayer not accept the reasons provided by 
SARS then he or she can lodge an objection in terms of Section 104 to 106 of the Tax 
Admin Act and as provided in Rule 4 of the Rules of the Tax Court.  Should SARS 
allow the objection, then the assessment will be altered accordingly.  However, should 
the objection be disallowed, then the taxpayer can appeal against the assessment in 
terms of Section 107 of the Tax Admin Act and as provided in Rule 6 of the Rules of 
the Tax Court93.  
 
SARS and the taxpayer can mutually agree to attempt to resolve the dispute by means 
of Alternative Dispute Resolution as provided in Section 107(5) and (6) and also set 
out in Rule 7 of the Rules of the Tax Court.  Alternatively, the taxpayer can approach 
the office of the Tax Ombudsman as provided for in Section 15 to 21 of the Tax 
Admin Act. The Tax Ombudsman is tasked with reviewing complaints by taxpayers 
in a fair and cost effective manner. SARS has indicated that the office of the 
Ombudsman will follow the same model as applied by the United Kingdom94. 
 
Should either party wish to proceed to litigation they can either approach the Tax 
Board or the Tax Court as the court of the first instance.  The Tax Board is provided 
for in Section 108 to 115 of the Tax Admin Act and Rule 8 of the Rules of the Tax 
Court. The Tax Board is regarded as an administrative tribunal and can only hear a 
dispute if the amount in dispute does not exceed R500 000.00.  This amount is 
determined by the Minister by Public Notice under section 109(1)(a) of the Tax 
Admin Act. 
                                                 
93 M Stiglingh et al. (note 90 above) 1138. 
94 B Croome ―The Tax Administration Act and Taxpayers' Rights‖ available at 





Should the amount in dispute exceed R500 000.00 or should the taxpayer or SARS 
not be satisfied with the Tax Boards findings, they can have the matter heard in the 
Tax Court as provided in Section 116 to 132 of the Tax Admin Act.  A decision by 
the Tax Court will be final and binding subject to the decision of either party to appeal 
to the Provincial Division of the High Court. Should an appeal be lodged against the 





With knowledge of the South African taxation system and how tax administration is 
regulated, an analysis and consideration of SARS ability to attach the tax liability of a 
CC to its members shall be undertaken.  The specific provisions in tax law which may 
empower SARS to ―lift or pierce the corporate veil‖ shall be discussed in the 






















                                                 





5.  SOUTH AFRICAN REVENUE SERVICE-PIERCING THE CORPORATE    
     VEIL 
 
This chapter will evaluate the efficacy of the lifting of the corporate veil doctrine in 
order for SARS to hold taxpayers standing behind the CC responsible for the tax debt 
of the CC.  A discussion of the common law, corporate legislation and in particular 
the prevailing tax legislation will be undertaken.  The purpose of which is to identify 
the various tools which SARS may employ in order to ―pierce the corporate veil‖. 
 
5.1 SARS use of the Common Law to Pierce the Corporate Veil 
 
In terms of the common law there are numerous tax cases illustrating how a company 
is liable for its own tax debts.  In the cases of ITC 161196, Hughes v Ridley97 and 
Ochberg v Commissioner for Inland Revenue98 it was confirmed that the profits, 
losses, assets and liabilities of a company belong to the company99. 
 
In ITC 1611100 the court stated that: 
 
――… a court can lift the veil only if that is legitimate by application of established doctrines, 
such as the plus valet rule or the fraus legis rule (or in other cases of fraud or dishonesty) or, 
possibly, the actio pauliana, that is if the requirements for such application are present, or a 
finding of a true relationship of principal and agent. There is, we consider, no self-standing 
doctrine of piercing the veil.‖101  
 
In the case of Ochberg v Commissioner of Inland Revenue102, certain items had been 
included by the Commissioner in Ochberg‘s taxable income for the year of 
assessment.  These amounts represented the value of shares allotted to him by a 
company, profit accrued from the sale of certain lots and profit accrued from the sale 
of certain portions of property.  The appellant contended that the decision was 
erroneous in law as none of the items under dispute constituted income as defined in 
the Income Tax Act. 
 
                                                 
96 ITC 1611 59 SATC 126. 
97 Hughes v Ridley 2010 (1) SA 381 KZP. 
98 Ochberg v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1931 AD 215. 
99 Derek Brits ―The Long Arm of the Tax Man‖ available at https://www.legalex.co.za/articles/long-
arm-tax-man, accessed on 18 March 2014. 
100 ITC 1611 (note 96 above). 
101 ITC 1611 (note 96 above). 
102 Ochberg v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (note 98 above). 
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This case dealt with various legal principles, but for the purposes of this research we 
will focus only on the principles relating to the piercing of the corporate veil.  In his 
judgement De Villiers CJ was of the view that the court should look to the substance 
of a transaction.  He further stated that: 
 
"The law endows a company with a fictitious personality. The wisdom of allowing a person to 
escape the natural consequences of his commercial sins under the ordinary law, and for his 
own private purposes virtually to turn him into a corporation with limited liability, may well 
be open to doubt. But as long as the law allows it the Court has to recognise the position. But 
then too the person himself must abide by that. A company, being a juristic person, remains a 
juristic person separate and distinct from the person who may own all the shares, and must not 
be confused with the latter.  To say that a company sustains a separate persona and yet in the 
same breath to argue that in substance the person holding all the shares is the company is an 
attempt to have it both ways, which cannot be allowed.‖103 
 
Traditionally, the common law notion of piercing the corporate veil is applied when 
the interests of creditors are balanced against the manner in which the directors, 
shareholders or members have conducted themselves in the running of the business 
entity.  An important and surprisingly unreported tax case is the Gauteng Tax Court 
case of CSARS v Metlika Trading Limited104. The judgment did not lay down any new 
principles, however what is important is that the court based its ruling on general 
common-law principles105.   
 
The case itself involved an interlocking of a web of companies and trusts established 
by a well-known entrepreneur, Mr David King. The taxability of profits made from 
the sale of shares in one of the companies, Specialised Outsourcing Ltd, was the 
subject of the dispute. Specialised Outsourcing Ltd was a subsidiary company of Ben 
Nevis Ltd which held 71% of its shares.  Ben Nevis Ltd authorised Mr David King to 
sell all the Specialised Outsourcing Ltd shares that it held.  Some of the proceeds from 
this sale were transferred directly to Mr David King‘s personal bank account which 
was used by him to purchase various assets106. 
 
                                                 
103 Ochberg v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (note 98 above) 99. 
104 CSARS v Metlika Trading Limited [2010] ZAGPPHC 17. 
105 Unknown ―Piercing the Corporate Veil‖ PWC available at 
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March 2015. 
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The taxability of the profits from the sale of the shares was assessed by SARS and 
various inquiries were made to Mr David King in this regard.  This was preceded by 
SARS launching an investigation and an inquiry in terms of Section 74 C of the 
Income Tax Act into the affairs of Mr David King.   
 
From the investigation it was concluded that Bermuda Trust which was in control of 
Ben Nevis Ltd had created a shelf company, called Metlika Trading Ltd, in the British 
Virgin Islands which would hold the proceeds of the Ben Nevis subsidiary companies. 
The result was that when SARS sought to tax the profits of the sale of the shares of 
Specialised Outsourcing Ltd, the ―cupboard was bare‖ as there were no funds to 
derive the tax from.  
 
On the basis of its findings SARS issued assessments against Ben Nevis Ltd and 
sought an order to pierce the corporate veil or alternatively to rely on the common law 
principle, the actio pauliana.  The actio pauliana is a Roman law remedy available 
when a debtor has disposed of his assets with the intent to defraud the creditor.  The 
court made mention of this principle, but did not provide an in depth discussion. 
 
The court applied the principles as laid down in the case of Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner 
Controlling Investments (Pty)Ltd107 whereby the court is empowered to pierce the 
corporate veil where there has been evidence of ―fraud, dishonesty or other improper 
conduct‖.   
 
In his judgment, Ledwaba J held that:  
 
―The transfer of assets of Ben Nevis to Metlika, on King‘s instruction, on an urgent basis was 
in my view, to create a ‗blind alley‘.‖108  
 
He held further that the documents: 
 
―clearly show that the transfer of assets was to stop SARS from tracing and attaching assets of 
Ben Nevis for tax purposes.‖109  
                                                 
107 Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty)Ltd (note 30 above). 




The court concluded that:  
 
―Metlika was based on a façade to hide the tax liability of Ben Nevis Ltd from SARS.‖110   
 
The court, using the common law principles held that the corporate veil of the 
company Metlika Trading Ltd should be pierced in order to enable SARS to attach its 
assets to satisfy the tax liability of another company, Ben Nevis Holdings Ltd111. 
 
This judgment can be regarded as a considerable victory for SARS as it establishes 
not only a precedent going forward but also provides a clear indication of how the tax 
courts are approaching the topic of piercing the corporate veil using common law 
principles. 
 
5.2 SARS use of Statute to Pierce the Corporate Veil 
 
Courts are usually reluctant to lift the corporate veil of an entity and ignore its 
separate existence.  However, in tax matters it appears as if this rule is flexible 
especially if there is a possibility that a tax evasion scheme has been implemented. 
Tax evasion can take a variety of forms.  The reason for tax evasion schemes is that 
they entitle the taxpayer to either a reduction in their tax liability or alternatively 
result in no tax liability. 
 
 
5.2.1 Realisation Companies 
 
There are numerous tax cases dealing with the issue of the taxability of the 
transactions of realisation companies.   
 
The concept of the realisation company was described best in the case of Berea West 
Estates (Pty) Ltd v SIR112.  The court stated that:  
 
                                                                                                                                            
109 CSARS v Metlika Trading Limited (note 104 above) Par 53. 
110 CSARS v Metlika Trading Limited (note 104 above) Par 61. 
111 Unknown ―Piercing the Corporate Veil‖ PWC available at 
https://www.saica.co.za/integritax/2013/2165.__Piercing_the_corporate_veil.htm,  accessed on 12 
March 2015. 
112 Berea West Estates (Pty) Ltd v SIR [1976] 38 SATC 43. 
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―A realisation company is formed for the purpose of facilitating a specific realisation of 
property and acts as a mechanism for carrying out the realisation function required by its 
shareholders.‖113   
 
The issue under dispute with realisation companies has been whether the proceeds 
derived from the sale of the particular asset under review constitutes gross income and 
thus taxable by SARS or whether the proceeds are not subject to tax as they constitute 
receipts or accruals of a capital nature.  The definition of Gross income is contained in 
Section 1 of the Income Tax Act.  
 
The intention of the taxpayer is the key factor in determining if a receipt or accrual is 
income or capital in nature.  The taxpayer‘s intention can therefore be regarded as 
either speculative or investment. A number of factors relating to intention can be 
considered when determining the nature of the proceeds. 
 
In the case of Elandsheuwel Farming (edms) Bpk v Sekretaris van Binnelandse 
Inkomste114 the test to determine intention was applied subjectively. In this case the 
concept of the realisation company was applied in conjunction with the lifting of the 
corporate veil principle.  The taxpayer, a realisation company, owned farm land which 
it leased out to farmers.  There was a change in the shareholding of the company and a 
decision was made to sell the land to the municipality.  A profit was derived from the 
sale which led to the question of whether these proceeds were income or capital in the 
hands of the taxpayer. It was held that the intentions of the new shareholders must be 
attributed to the taxpayer. The court lifted the corporate veil of the realisation 
company and examined the new shareholders intentions to establish if there had been 
a change in the intention and subsequent ―crossing of the rubicon‖.  The proceeds 
derived from the sale were deemed to be income in the hands of the taxpayer and thus 
taxable by SARS. 
 
In the case of ITC1406115 the court found that the lifting of the veil was not necessary 
as the change in shareholding had only amounted to 50% change in shareholding. 
 
                                                 
113 Ibid 59. 
114 Elandsheuwel Farming (edms) Bpk v Sekretaris van Binnelandse inkomste 39 SATC 163 (a) – 1978. 
115 ITC1406 48 SATC 12. 
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In both cases emphasis was placed on the intention of the shareholders of the 
company.  This is a clear illustration of the application of the doctrine of lifting or 
piercing the corporate veil by SARS and the tax courts.   
 
5.2.2 Simulated Transactions  
 
Although not promoted by South African tax law, every person is entitled to arrange 
his or her affairs in a manner that reduces their tax burden.  However, a thin line 
exists between the concepts of ―tax planning and subsequent tax avoidance‖ and ―tax 
evasion‖. In the United Kingdom case of IRC v Duke of Westminster116, Lord Tomlin 
summarised the concept of tax planning as follows:  
 
―every man is entitled, if he can, to order his affairs so that the tax attaching is less than it 
otherwise would be‖.117   
 
One of the most common forms of tax evasion schemes occurs when the parties that 
have entered into a contract attempt to disguise the true nature of their dealings in 
order to claim a tax benefit. Tax planning structures generally involve an 
interconnection of natural persons and legal entities.  The question is when can SARS 
re-characterise contractual arrangements for taxation purposes?118   
 
Tax evasion was dealt with previously in terms of section 103 of the Income Tax Act.  
Sections 80A to 80L titled ―impermissible avoidance arrangement‖ have since been 
introduced into the Income Tax Act to act as a further safety net for SARS.  These 
provisions enable the court to look to the substance of the transaction rather than its 
form.  In particular, Section 80B(1)(a) to (e) allows the Commissioner to, for example 
disregard or combine any steps in the arrangement or deem different parties as one 
and the same person.   
 
There are a variety of cases where the separate corporate personality of a company 
have been used to mask the true intentions of the parties to a sham or a simulated 
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transaction in order to take advantage of  tax laws in order to acquire tax benefits. The 
tax courts have shown little hesitation in lifting or piercing the corporate veil in these 
matters to determine the true intention of the parties to the transaction.  
 
The grounds for the refusal of SARS to allow a tax benefit are based on the fact that 
the transaction in question has been disguised.  Disguising a transaction reveals an 
element of dishonesty. The true transaction, once uncovered, does not allow for the 
tax benefit claimed, hence there has been an impermissible tax avoidance 
arrangement. In the case of Commissioner of Customs and Excise v Randles Brothers 
and Hudson Ltd119 a ―disguised transaction‖ was explained as follows: 
 
―In essence it is a dishonest transaction: dishonest, in as much as the parties to it do not really 
intend it to have, inter parties, the legal effect which its terms convey to the outside world. 
The purpose of the disguise is to deceive by concealing what is the real agreement or 
transaction between the parties. The parties wish to hide the fact that their real agreement or 
transaction falls within the prohibition or is subject to the tax, and so they dress it up in a 
guise which conveys the impression that it is outside of the prohibition or not subject to the 
tax.‖120 
 
The tax case of ERF 3183/1 Ladysmith (Pty) and Another v CIR121 is regarded as the 
leading case on the principles relating to simulated transactions.  The parties were 
involved in disguised transactions and made use of a dormant subsidiary company and 
a holding company.  In applying the Income Tax Act, in particular the anti-avoidance 
provision contained in section 103 of the Income Tax Act, the court lifted the 
corporate veil of the entities and looked at the true intention of the parties.  It was held 
that the substance of an agreement reflected the true intention of the parties.   
 
The decision in another tax case Relier (Pty) Ltd v CIR122, was based on the outcome 
of the same factual and legal issues that were considered in the case of ERF 3183/1 
Ladysmith (Pty) and Another v CIR 123.  In both the case of ERF 3183/1 Ladysmith 
                                                 
119 Commissioner of Customs and Excise v Randles Brothers and Hudson Ltd (1941) AD 369. 
120 Ibid. 
121 ERF 3183/1 Ladysmith (Pty) and Another v CIR, 58 SATC 229. 
122 Relier (Pty) Ltd v CIR, 60 SATC 1. 
123 ERF 3183/1 Ladysmith (Pty) and Another v CIR (note 121 above). 
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(Pty) and Another v CIR 124 and the case of Relier (Pty) Ltd v CIR125 the question 
arose whether the separate corporate personality of that entity had been abused due to 
the entity claiming the tax benefit. Both courts did not hesitate to lift the corporate 
veil of the entity. 
 
5.2.3 Appointment as an Agent of the Taxpayer 
 
Sections 95-101 of the Income Tax Act was titled ―Representative taxpayer‖. Section 
99 of the Income Tax Act gave the Commissioner a discretionary power to declare 
any person an agent of the taxpayer.  This section therefore empowered the 
Commissioner to appoint any person such as employers, banks, members, 
shareholders, directors or retirement funds as being liable for the taxpayer‘s tax 
debt126.  The declaration as an agent of the taxpayer is termed the representative 
taxpayer. This section bares a striking resemblance to the veil piercing doctrine as 
should a juristic entity not be able to pay its tax liability; the Commissioner could 
appoint the member or shareholder as the agent of the taxpayer hence rendering them 
personally liable for the entities tax debt.    
 
Section 99 states that: 
 
―The Commissioner may, if he thinks necessary, declare any person to be the agent of 
any other person, and the person so declared an agent shall be the agent for the 
purposes of this Act and may be required to make payment of any tax, interest or 
penalty due from any moneys, including pensions, salary, wages or any other 
remuneration, which may be held by him for or due by him to the person whose agent 
he has been declared to be‖. 
 
The case of Pestana v Nedbank Limited127 provides a practical example of the 
application of this section.  In this case the bank of Mr Pestana was appointed as an 
agent by SARS as they were in possession of funds belonging to Mr Pestana.     
 
                                                 
124 ERF 3183/1 Ladysmith (Pty) and Another v CIR (note 121 above) 
125 Relier (Pty) Ltd v CIR (note 122 above). 
126 EN Sonnenbergs  ―Appointment as Payment Agents‖  available at 
https://www.saica.co.za/integritax/2011/2010._Appointment_as_payment_agent.htm, accessed on 5 
July 2015. 
127 Pestana v Nedbank Limited 2008 (3) SA466 (W). 
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5.2.4 Corporate Legislation 
 
As discussed previously, the veil piercing provisions contained in section 65 of the 
CC Act and Section 20(9) of the 2008 Act are also mechanisms that may be used 
effectively by SARS as supportive means to pierce the corporate veil of an entity to 
satisfy a tax debt. 
 
 
5.3 SARS use of the Tax Administration Act 28 of 2011 to Pierce the Corporate Veil 
 
As previously mentioned, tax administration in South Africa is primarily regulated by 
the Tax Admin Act.  The Act has provided SARS with even further-reaching powers 
to enforce the collection of a corporation‘s tax debts by proceeding against its 
directors, members or shareholders.   
 
The definition of a taxpayer is contained in Section 151 of the Tax Admin Act:  
 
―a person chargeable to tax; a representative taxpayer; a withholding agent; a 
responsible third party and a person who is the subject of a request to provide 
information under an international agreement‖. 
 
 
5.3.1 Representative Taxpayer 
 
The definition of a taxpayer in section 151 of the Tax Admin Act contains the term 
―representative taxpayer‖.  The concept of the representative taxpayer first appeared 
in the Income Tax Act and the VAT Act.  The Tax Admin Act has retained this 
concept and extended its application even further.   
 
The representative taxpayer is contained in Chapter 10 Section 153 of the Tax Admin 
Act.  Section 153 titled ―Tax Liability and Payment‖ defines a Representative 
taxpayer as: 
 
―(1)  In this Act, a representative taxpayer means a person who is responsible for  
       paying the tax liability of another person as an agent, other than as a withholding  
       agent,and includes a person who- 
(a)  is a representative taxpayer in terms of the Fourth Schedule to the Income Tax  
      Act;or 
(b) is a representative employer in terms of the Fourth Schedule to the Income Tax  
      Act;or 
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(c) is a representative vendor in terms of section 46 of the Value-Added Tax Act‖.  
 
This provision provides that a representative taxpayer is: 
 
―a person who is responsible for paying the tax liability of another person as an agent, 
other than a withholding agent‖.   
 
Every juristic person has to appoint a representative taxpayer, who can be liable for 
the tax liability of the taxpayer that he represents in his representative capacity as well 
as in his personal capacity.  This concept bears a striking resemblance to the provision 
of personal security by one party for the debt of another in the form of a suretyship.  
Should the tax liability remain unpaid then the representative taxpayer becomes 
personally liable for the tax debt. 
 
Chapter 10 of the Tax Admin Act is titled ―tax liability and payment‖. Section 154(1) 
sets out the tax liability of the representative taxpayer:  
 
―(a)  the income to which the representative taxpayer is entitled;   
(b)  moneys to which the representative taxpayer is entitled or has the management or  
       control;   
(c)  transactions concluded by the representative taxpayer; and   
(d)  anything else done by the representative taxpayer,   
  
 in such capacity as a representative taxpayer, such person is:  
     
(i)  subject to the duties, responsibilities and liabilities of the taxpayer represented;   
      entitled to any abatement, deduction, exemption, right to set off a loss, and other   
      items that could be claimed by the person represented; and   
(ii)  liable for the amount of tax specified by a tax Act.‖   
 
Section 155(1) governs the ―personal liability of a representative taxpayer‖ and states 
that: -a representative taxpayer will be personally liable for tax payable in the 





(a)  the representative taxpayer alienates, charges or disposes of amounts in respect of  
       which the tax is chargeable; or   
(b)  the representative taxpayer disposes of or parts with funds or moneys, which are   
       in the representative taxpayer‘s possession or come to the representative taxpayer  
       after the tax is payable, if the tax could legally have been paid from or out of the  
       funds or moneys.‖   
 
The corporation as the principle taxpayer is not relieved from its tax liability when 
SARS has determined that the representative taxpayer must pay any outstanding tax 
debt. Further to this, the representative taxpayer has the right to indemnity after 
paying the relevant tax debt128. A representative taxpayer may, however, be held 
personally liable for tax payable in a representative capacity if, while the tax debt 
remains unpaid: 
 
―a representative taxpayer: alienates, charges, or disposes of amounts in respect of 
which the tax is chargeable; or disposes of or parts with funds or monies, which are or 
came into the possession of the representative taxpayer after the tax is payable, if the 
tax could legally have been paid from those funds or monies.‖  
 
The Tax Admin Act makes it quite clear that every company must have an appointed 
representative taxpayer.  The representative taxpayer of a company is known as the 
―public officer‖ of the company.  Section 246 (1) of the Tax Admin Act titled ―Public 
officers of companies‖ provides as follows:-  
 
 ―Every company carrying on business or having an office in the Republic must at all 
times be represented by an individual residing in the Republic‖. 
 
The Act further requires in Subsection 2(a) that the public officer must be: ―a senior 
official of the company that is approved by SARS‖.   
 
Chapter 11 titled ―Recovery of Tax‖ provides in Section 169 (2)(a) that: 
 
―a tax debt due to SARS is recoverable by SARS under this Chapter, and Is 
recoverable from- 
                                                 
128 CD Hofmeyr  ―Persons liable for tax‖ SAICA available at 




(a)  in the case of a representative taxpayer who is not personally liable under section  
      155, any assets belonging to the person represented which are in the  
      representative taxpayer‘s possession or under his or her management or control‖ 
 
Prior to the introduction of the Tax Admin Act, if a juristic entity had an outstanding 
tax liability, SARS would issue letters of demand to the legal entities members, 
shareholders or directors.  These letters would request the members, shareholders or 
directors to provide SARS with a reasonable explanation as to why they or another 
third party should not be held personally responsible for the entities tax debt. SARS 
would further state that if the requested explanation does not reach their offices within 
21 business days, they would have no alternative but to come to the conclusion that 
they or the particular third party is personally liable for the outstanding tax debt. 
Furthermore, there would be no access to further legal remedies129.   
 
Since the inception of the Tax Admin Act, SARS now issue letters of demand to the 
members, shareholders or directors of the juristic entity titled "Notice of Personal 
Liability of Representative Taxpayer".  These letters allege the particular member, 
shareholder or director is the appointed representative taxpayer of the juristic entity as 
provided for in terms of section 153(1)(a), 153(1)(b) and 153(1)(c) of the Tax Admin 
Act130. 
 
Consequently as the representative taxpayer the member, shareholder or director is 
subject to the duties, responsibilities and liabilities of the taxpayer whom they 
represent.  They are also liable for any amount of tax that has not been paid by the 
legal entity.  This onerous letter issued by SARS maintains that SARS can actually 
hold an individual such as the member, shareholder or director of the juristic entity 





                                                 
129 D Brits ―The Long Arm of the Tax Man‖ available at https://www.legalex.co.za/articles/long-arm-
tax-man, accessed on 18 March 2014. 
130 CD Hofmeyr ―Personal liability for tax debts‖ SAICA available at 




5.3.2 Responsible Third Parties 
 
The definition of a taxpayer contained in Section 151 of the Tax Admin Act, includes 
the phrase ―A responsible third party‖.  The term ―responsible third party‖ is defined 
in Section 158 as follows: 
 
―responsible third party means a person who becomes otherwise liable for the tax 
liability of another person, other than as a representative taxpayer or as a withholding 
agent, whether in a personal or representative capacity‖. 
 
Such person can be a third party appointed by SARS to satisfy tax debts, a person 
involved in the financial management of a taxpayer, a shareholder of a company, a 
member of a close corporation, or a  transferee or a person who assisted with the 
dissipation of assets. 
 
The collection of the tax debt from the third party is contained in Sections 179 to 184 
of the Tax Admin Act.  These provisions empower SARS to collect and recover a 
taxpayer‘s tax liability from third parties.   
 
Without a doubt, the most far reaching provision contained in the Tax Admin Act that 
provides SARS with a surmountable amount of power to collect corporation‘s tax 
debts is undoubtedly the provisions of Section 180 of the Tax Admin Act131.  This 
Section provides that: 
 
―a person is personally liable for any tax debt of the taxpayer to the extent that the 
person‘s negligence or fraud resulted in the failure to pay the tax debt if- 
(a) the person controls or is regularly involved in the management of the overall 
financial affairs of a taxpayer‖ 
 
When exactly a person is deemed to be ―in control or is regularly involved in the 
management of the overall financial affairs‖ of the entity is a question of fact and one 
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which will depend on the facts of the case under review132.  The term control is 
defined in the International Financial Reporting Standards. These standards describe 
the term as ―having the power to govern the financial and operating policies of an 
enterprise so as to obtain benefits from its activities‖. Control is presumed when for 
example a holding company obtains more than half of the voting rights of the 
corporation. The holding company in this position may be held liable for outstanding 
tax133. 
 
It would seem that section 180 of the Tax Admin Act contemplates the establishment 
of a causal link between the person and the affairs of the company.  In the absence of 
such a link, the person would not be liable under this section.  The trigger for such 
personal liability will be the elements of negligence or fraud on the part of that 
person.  This provision provides SARS with the exact same powers of recovery 
against the third party as it has against the taxpayer himself. 
 
Shareholders of a company may also incur personal liability for a company's tax debts 
as contained in Section 181 of the Tax Admin Act.  This provision titled, ―Liability of 
shareholders for tax debts‖ provides that: 
 
―where a company is wound up other than by means of an involuntary liquidation 
without having satisfied its tax debt, including its liability as a responsible third 
withholding agent, or a representative taxpayer, employer or vendor‖. 
 
Subsection (2) provides further that: 
 
―Persons who are shareholders of the company within one year prior to its winding up 
are jointly and severally liable to pay the unpaid tax…‖ 
 
It is submitted that it appears as though the Tax Admin Act has paved the way even 
further for SARS to target the directors, members or shareholders in their personal 
                                                 
132 CD Hofmeyr Available at 
https://www.saica.co.za/integritax/2012/2080._Personal_liability_for_tax_debts.htm, accessed on 5 
August 2015. 
133 Derek Brits ―The Long Arm of the Tax Man‖ available at https://www.legalex.co.za/articles/long-
arm-tax-man, accessed on 18 March 2014. 
61 
 
capacity for the tax debts of the juristic entity.  It can be concluded from these 
provisions that the Tax Admin Act contemplates and seems to facilitate the piercing 




The courts findings in CSARS v Metlika Trading Limited134confirm that SARS was 
able to pierce the corporate veil of a company in order to satisfy the payment of tax 
debts in terms of the common law principles.  The introduction of the Tax Admin Act 
and the 2008 Act have provided SARS with even further reaching powers to attach 
the tax liability of a corporation to its members.  It appears as though SARS is now 
able to elect which method to employ in order to pierce the corporate veil of a CC.  In 
view of the findings and in order to broaden the enquiry a comparative analysis of 





























                                                 





6.  A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
 
The approach of tax authorities in other jurisdictions with regards to the veil piercing 
doctrine shall be considered.  This chapter will consider the approach followed in a 
variety of countries in order to establish whether the South African tax authorities are 
aligning with international practices. 
 
6.1 A Comparative Analysis of South Africa, United Kingdom and the United States   
     of America with Piercing the Corporate Veil in Tax matters 
 
The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil and in particular veil piercing in tax 
matters have been increasingly applied by the courts and revenue authorities globally.   
 
The taxation authority in the United Kingdom is the HM Revenue and Customs 
(hereinafter referred to as the HMRC). The HMRC reports to Parliament through the 
Treasury minister who oversees the finances within the country.  A policy partnership 
exists between the HMRC and the treasury whereby the treasury controls strategic tax 
policy and policy development, and the HMRC controls policy maintenance and 
implementation135.  
 
Statutory exceptions enacted by Parliament with regards to the separate legal 
personality of a juristic entity that have been codified in the United Kingdom include 
but is not limited to: Failure to obtain a trading license as contained in Section 767(3) 
of the Companies Act 2006; Failure to use the company‘s name as contained in 
Section 349(4) of the CA 1985; Disqualified directors as contained under Section 15 
of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986; Just and equitable winding 
under Section122(1)(g) of the Insolvency Act 1986 and Fraudulent trading under 
Section 213 of the Insolvency Act of 1986.   
 
In the 2010 Supreme Court case of Holland v The Commissioners for Her Majesty’s 
Revenue and Customs and another136, the issue under review was whether a director 
                                                 
135 Unknown ―Government UK HMRC‖ https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/hm-revenue-
customs/about, accessed on 24 May 2014. 




could be deemed a de facto director of a company that had made unlawful dividend 
payments.  
 
In this case Mr and Mrs Holland ran a business administering the business and tax 
affairs of contractors. The Holland‘s set up various trading companies for each 
business in a manner whereby they would be subject to lower tax rates.  They further 
incorporated two other companies to act as the sole director and secretary of each 
trading company.  The Holland‘s were the directors of these two companies and also 
owned each trading company via another company. The trading companies became 
insolvent and HMRC pursued Mr Holland as a de facto director.  
 
The Supreme Court rejected the appeal lodged by HMRC. In giving his judgment 
Lord Hope found that Mr Holland could not be declared a de facto director as Mr 
Holland and the companies were in law separate personalities.  Mr Holland was found 
to have acted within his role as the director of a sole corporate director. It was 
submitted that if a director acted within the ambit of his duties and responsibilities 
then he cannot be held personally liable for the entities debts.  Parliament has not 
enacted a provision which provides for such personal liability.  The court did not 
pierce the corporate veil in this instance. 
 
In the United Kingdom the veil piercing doctrine is recognised.  However, it is 
submitted that it is strictly applied in practice.  Judicial precedents in the United 
Kingdom clearly show that this principle will not be implemented for the sole reason 
that justice permits it to do so. The courts require the element of fraud as a legitimate 
ground for applying the doctrine.  The court looks to the form of a transaction and not 
the substance, unless there is conclusive evidence of fraud in which case the court will 
look to the substance of a transaction. 
 
It would appear that the tax courts in South Africa will more readily pierce the 
corporate veil of an entity in comparison to the courts in the United Kingdom. The 
element of fraud appears to be the deciding factor for the United Kingdom courts to 
pursue the matter further and to look at the substance of a transaction rather than its 
form.  The South African courts do not have to rely on any principle to lift the 
corporate veil of an entity to look at its substance rather than its form.  Furthermore, 
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the common law doctrine has not been applied consistently by the South African 
courts resulting in the application of a variety of elements and principles.  Corporate 
Statutes in South Africa have codified the elements of ―Gross abuse‖ and 
―Unconscionable abuse‖ as principles that may allow for the piercing of the corporate 
veil. 
 
In the United States of America taxation is imposed on both a federal level and a state 
level. Federal taxes and state taxes are completely separate and they even have a 
separate authority to charge taxes. In the United State of America each state has its 
own taxation system and within each state there are several jurisdictions that charge 
taxes.  The United State of America‘s taxation authority is the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS).  The Internal Revenue Code is the domestic portion of federal statutory 
tax law in the United States.  
 
The veil piercing doctrine originated in the United States of America and therefore 
has common law roots. It is not uncommon in the United States of America for 
federal legislation to have provisions that will attach liability to the members of 
corporations for the acts of that company. This would normally be in instances where 
there would be a grave injustice should the company be regarded as a separate form. 
Each state within the United States of America develops its own set of elements that 
should be taken into account when determining if an entity should not be regarded as 
a separate persona. In the United States of America, the doctrine of piercing the 
corporate veil is called the ―Corporate Personhood‖.  
 
A company‘s separate legal identity independent from its members was established in 
the case of Bank of Augusta v. Earle137. Some authors have tried to codify the 
requirements for piercing of the veil and term it ―the totality of circumstances rule‖. 
Ultimately, it is the judge‘s decision as each case is judged on its merits.  The scope 
of abuse by the members of a company appears to be a deciding factor138.  
 
                                                 
137 Bank of Augusta v. Earle 38 U.S. 519 (1839). 
138 A Farat ―Lifting the Corporate Veil:‖ available at http://www.commonlawreview.cz/lifting-the-
corporate-veil-limited-liability-of-the-company-decision-makers-undermined-analysis-of-englishus-
german-czech-and-polish-approach, accessed on 15 August 2014. 
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Federal tax court decisions dealing with the piercing of the corporate veil have shown 
that the state must first look to property law concerning the alter ego, or as we know it 
the piercing of the veil, before it can establish if the liability is attached to the alter 
egos property139.   
 
In the case of G.M Leasing Corp v United States140 it was held that:  ―if an entity is a 
taxpayers alter ego then it is appropriate to regard all of the entity‘s assets as that of 
the taxpayers property for tax collection purposes‖.   In Towe Antizue Ford Found v 
Commissioner141 the court stated that: 
 
―The alter ego doctrine often involves ―piercing the corporate veil‖ to hold an individual or 
shareholder liable for the debts of a business entity, although ―reverse piercing‖ may also be 
used to recover a taxpayer‘s delinquent tax liability from his alter ego business entity.  The 
alter ego doctrine therefore involves the imposition of liability on an entity by treating that 
entity as the taxpayer for tax collection purposes.‖142 
 
The United States of America derives its veil piercing powers from the federal 
common law.  The courts also place a great emphasis on property law when dealing 
with the veil piercing doctrine. It is submitted that the courts in the United States of 
America are less hesitant to pierce the corporate veil of a juristic person than the 
courts in the United Kingdom.  South Africa‘s English law influence can be seen in 
corporate law in that extenuating circumstances must exist before the courts will 
permit the encroachment of the separate personality of a juristic entity.  This however 
does not seem to be the position in tax cases.   
 
Tax authorities in South Africa have aligned themselves to the same position that the 
United States of America follows.  South Africa has well drafted tax statutes which 
provide that SARS may appoint other persons to be held liable for an entities tax debt. 
The tax courts have also clearly shown their flexibility with the veil piercing doctrine 
when the need calls for it. 
                                                 
139 New Jersey Law Journal ―Tax Law‖ available at  
   http://www.scarincihollenbeck.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Brunetti-IRS-Peircing-Corp-Veil2-  
   6-121.pdf , accessed on 6 October 2014. 
140 G.M Leasing Corp v United States 429 US 338351 (1977). 




6.2 Case law on Piercing the Corporate Veil in Tax matters in the Philippines,  
     India, Canada and China 
 
It is submitted that a common feature in most countries is that when there are 
elements of fraud or tax evasion, the courts do not hesitate in lifting or piercing the 
corporate veil in order to determine the true substance of the transaction or entity that 
is the object of the dispute.  In particular, the tax authorities of countries generally 
show no hesitation in piercing the corporate veil of an entity in order to recover a tax 
debt and to attach the entities tax liability to its shareholders, members or directors. 
 
In the republic of the Philippines the Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue v. Menguito143 showed no hesitation in piercing the corporate veil.  
In this case a Sole Proprietor and corporation were treated as one taxable entity due to 
the manner in which the entities were managed.  The court stated that:  
 
―In a number of cases, the Court has shredded the veil of corporate identity and ruled that 
where a corporation is merely an adjunct, business conduit or alter ego of another corporation 
or when they practice fraud on our internal revenue laws,the fiction of their separate and 
distinct corporate identities shall be disregarded, and both entities treated as one taxable 
person, subject to assessment for the same taxable transaction.‖144 
 
The Supreme Court explained further that the doctrine of piercing the veil of entities 
would apply when the separate juristic personality of a corporation is used in a 
manner to perpetuate fraud on the countries internal-revenue laws.  It was further 
submitted in this case that no hard and fast rules apply to veil piercing and that each 
case is judged on its merits.   
 
Another important application of the principle of piercing the corporate veil in the 
Phillipines applies in instances of tax avoidance.  The Supreme court has in a number 
of cases pierced the entities veil where corporate entities have been used as 
―dummies‖ to serve as shields for tax evasion145.   
 
 
                                                 
143 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Menguito (G.R. No. 167560, September 17, 2008). 
144 Ibid Par 28. 
145 SAD Tizon ―Piercing the Corporate Veil for Tax Purposes‖ available at 
www.bdblaw.com.ph/index.php?option=com_dms&task=doc, accessed on 09 January 2014. 
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In India, the law is heavily influenced by English Law.  The result is that the law in 
India bears a striking resemblance to the law in the United Kingdom.  The Income 
Tax Act 1961 is the primary Act that regulates taxation in India.  The government in 
India has recently introduced a draft statute called the Direct Tax Codes which is 
intended to replace the Income Tax Act 1961.  The courts in India apply the doctrine 
of piercing the corporate veil.  This is evident in a number of cases: Sunil 
Siddharthbhai v CIT, Ahemedabad146; CIT v Sri Meenakshi Mills Ltd & ors147; and 
Life Insurance Corporation of India v Escorts Ltd148.  
 
The court in the tax case Pravinbhai M Kheni v ACIT149 had commenced tax recover 
procedures of a company.  The tax authorities were unable to recover funds from the 
company.  They therefore applied Section 179 of the Income Tax Act 1961 which 
enabled them to recover the tax debt from the director of the company.  The court 
turned to the concept of piercing the corporate veil which it termed ―cracking the 
corporate shell‖ and discussed how the courts would apply this principle in two 
instances.  Firstly, when statute permits the encroachment and secondly: 
 
―when due to glaring facts on record it is found that a complex web has been created 
only with a view to defraud the revenue interest of the State. If it is found that incorporation 
of an entity is only to create a smoke screen to defraud the revenue and shield the individuals 
who behind the corporate veil are the real operators of the company and beneficiaries of the 
fraud, the Courts have not hesitated in ignoring the corporate status and striking at the real 
beneficiaries of such complex design.‖150 
 
The court discussed the application of Section 179 of the Income Tax Act 1961 and 
deemed it to be ―a statutory creation of piercing of the corporate veil‖. The issue in 
dispute was discussed regarding the varying applications of this provision to private 
and public companies. The Honourable Gujarat High Court reiterated the fact that the 
corporate veil can be pierced by the tax authorities, particularly in cases where 
companies are used as tools to escape tax liabilities. The High Court in this case even 
placed the liability to pay taxes upon the directors of public limited companies151.  
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In Canada, the basic rule is that veil piercing for taxation purposes is to be applied in 
exceptional circumstances only. Such an exception can be found in the landmark case 
of Toronto (City) v Famous Players Canadian Corp10 and Aluminum Co of Canada v 
Toronto (City)152.  This case involved the use of a subsidiary company and a holding 
company, which resulted in the income of the subsidiary company being included in 
the income of the holding company for taxation purposes.  The court stated that: ――in 
a way the subsidiary was a puppet in the hands of the parent company as it had no 
independent functioning of its own‖.  In the Canadian tax courts to justify the 
infringement on the legal personality of the corporation, there must be proof of fraud. 
 
In China, as reported in the China Tax News153, the PRC tax authorities will pierce 
the corporate veil when recovering a tax liability.  In this case, there was a transfer of 
shares from one company to another without informing the Chinese tax authorities of 
the substantial capital gain.  Years later, the transaction was discovered by the 
Qinhuangda tax authorities, but at this point the company had already been de-
registered in Hong Kong.  The tax authorities approached Mr Yu for payment of the 
capital gains tax as he was a legal representative and shareholder of the de-registered 
company.  Initially, Mr Yu refused to pay the tax liability as he was not the only 
shareholder of the company under review, but eventually paid the outstanding tax154. 
 
CONCLUSION 
It is submitted that it is evident that tax authorities globally will pierce the corporate 
veil in order to satisfy a tax debt.  The courts in various countries show no hesitation 
in piercing the corporate veil where for example there have been instances of tax 
evasion, elements of fraud or abuse of the separate legal identity of a juristic person.  
South Africa follows the tax global approach when it comes to the need to lift the 
corporate veil.   
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The aim of this research was to discuss the ability of SARS to attach the tax liability 
of a juristic entity to a corporation‘s members, shareholders or directors. This would 
mean that SARS may pierce the corporate veil of the corporation in order to attach the 
tax debt to the key players of the entity. 
 
The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil is a well-established principle in foreign 
jurisdictions. In comparison to other jurisdictions, the South African tax courts have 
not as readily applied the principle of piercing the corporate veil for tax liability.  
However, it appears as though the South African tax courts could soon be following 
suit with the introduction of the Tax Admin Act and the 2008 Act.  
 
There are a variety of options at SARS disposal that could assist them in their quest to 
recover a tax debt. It appears as though the common law principles of the doctrine of 
veil piercing have already been successfully applied by SARS as is evident in the case 
of CSARS v Metlika Trading Limited155.      
 
As an alternative to the common law, an application to court to pierce the corporate 
veil may be brought in terms of Section 20(9) of the 2008 Act or Section 65 of the CC 
Act when dealing with juristic persons.  Both the 2008 Act and the CC Act do not list 
the circumstances in which the veil may be pierced, but instead use broad all-
encompassing terms like ―unconscionable abuse‖ and ―gross abuse‖.  The failure of 
the company or close corporation to pay taxes may amount to an ―unconscionable 
abuse‖ or ―gross abuse‖ in which case section 20(9) or 65 may apply.  While every 
decision depends on the facts of each case, it is submitted that it is imperative that 
members, shareholders and directors tread lightly in this area. Of particular 
importance is to ensure that any movement of funds or loan accounts within 
companies be managed carefully showing a clear division between the companies and 
the members, shareholders and directors. 
                                                 




The Tax Admin Act has provided SARS with even further reaching powers to enforce 
the collection of a corporation‘s tax debts against its members, shareholders or 
directors.  The provisions contained in the Tax Admin Act, in particular Section 180, 
seem to facilitate and contemplate the piercing of the corporate veil in certain 
instances.  The concept of the representative taxpayer as contained in Section 153 of 
the Tax Admin Act appears to be a form of personal security by one party for the debt 
of another in the form of a surety.  Should the corporation be unable to satisfy a tax 
debt owed to SARS, then SARS could seek satisfaction for payment of the tax 
liability from the representative taxpayer.   
 
Section 158 of the Tax Admin Act introduces the concept of a responsible third party. 
According to this provision, SARS has the exact same powers of recovery against the 
person they deem to be the responsible third party as it has against the taxpayer. 
SARS could determine that the member of the corporation is considered to be the 
responsible third party and deem them personally responsible for the tax liability of 
the corporation. The Tax Admin Act could indeed allow SARS to go behind the 
corporate curtain to receive compensation for a tax debt.  
 
The introduction of statutes within the tax and corporate law sphere, coupled with the 
common law and in particular the most recent judgement in the case of Ex parte 
Stephen Malcolm Gore NO and 37 others NO156 could indeed aid SARS in their quest 
to argue that where a corporation lacks the financial resources to pay its taxes, such 
liability should be imposed on other parties such as the members, shareholders or 
directors. 
 
It is submitted that in light of the introduction of the new corporate and tax law 
provisions that only time will tell in which direction the courts will proceed in matters 
involving the collection of taxes from corporate entities that are unable to pay their 
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